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ABSTRACT
For Aristotle, prudence or practical wisdom is a virtue of thought that is practical rather 
than theoretical and deliberative rather than intuitive. It is the intellectual virtue that 
perfects reasoning in regard to decision making in the realm of human action. To have 
this virtue is to be good at thinking about how to live a fulfilled life as a whole, and to 
be successful in so doing. The prudent person is the only one who is truly just, 
courageous and temperate, and the good person is truly good only if he is prudent. 
According to Aristotle, there is a fundamental connection between prudence and moral 
virtue. This connection depends on the pre-existence of certain natural qualities. 
Although Aristotle stresses the importance of prudence and the ethical life, he holds that 
the human person -  endowed as he is with the divine element of reason -  is capable of 
an even higher way of life. This is the life of contemplation, the life dedicated to the 
appreciation of truth, the life that is closest to the way of life of the gods.
For St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle is the Philosopher. In treating of prudence, Aquinas 
follows Aristotle very closely especially in his Commentary on Aristotle’s 
'Nicomachean Ethics He teaches that prudence is a virtue of the practical intellect that 
is related in a particularly close way to the moral virtues. In order to be morally good, a 
person needs the moral virtues, and these in turn need the judgment of prudence. 
Aquinas’s interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of prudence are more accurate than, and 
indeed represent improvements on, those advanced by other leading authorities o fh ;s
time, including St. Albert the Great in his Super Ethica. In ways that are significant, he 
changes and develops some of Aristotle’s teachings on prudence in both his 
Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics ’ and in some o f his more theological 
works, e.g., his Summa Theologiae. For example, Aquinas holds that Aristotle’s 
conception o f ultimate end or human flourishing -  by Aristotle’s own statement -  can 
only be realized in an imperfect way in this life.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1
In contemporary western culture, people who are considered prudent are thought of as 
careful and cautious, circumspect and discreet. They are regarded as having a thought 
for the future and an aversion to risk, especially in relation to financial matters. 
Although they might be clever and energetic in the matter of furthering their own 
interests, they are sometimes judged as not being particularly admirable from a moral 
point of view. Writing almost fifty years ago, Josef Pieper stated that ‘to the 
contemporary mind, prudence seems less a prerequisite to goodness than an evasion of 
it’.1 Pieper went on to consider prudence in the context of the other cardinal virtues, 
i.e., justice, fortitude and temperance. His reflection on the relationship between 
prudence and fortitude or courage is illustrative. That courage is an important virtue is 
regarded as self-evident nowadays. However, prudence is sometimes thought of as 
almost the opposite of morality.
Certainly, the common mind regards prudence and fortitude as virtually 
contradictory ideas. A ‘prudent’ man is thought to be one who avoids the 
embarrassing situation o f having to be brave. The ‘prudent’ man is the ‘clever 
tactician’ who contrives to escape personal commitment. Those who shun danger 
are wont to account for their attitude by appealing to the necessity for ‘prudence’. 
(Pieper, p. 11)
Although Pieper’s observations were made in the late 1950s, they are as true today as 
they were then. Because o f its connotations of extreme cautiousness and selfish 
calculation, prudence -  to the extent that it is perceived as a virtue at all in our time -  is 
regarded as having only a limited importance.
1 J o s e f  P i e p e r ,  P ru dence, t r a n s .  b y  R i c h a r d  a n d  C l a r a  W in s to n  ( L o n d o n :  F a b e r  a n d  F a b e r ,  1 9 5 9 ) ,  p p .  1 0 -
11 .
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The contemporary understanding of prudence would strike both Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas as being very peculiar. For them, prudence or practical wisdom is the virtue of 
thought concerned with action in the world of contingency, i.e., the world as 
unpredictable and variable. It is the intellectual virtue that perfects reasoning in regard 
to decision making in the realm of human action. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, 
the person who is prudent is the only one who can be truly just, courageous and 
temperate, and the good person is truly good only if  he is prudent. ‘What is prudent and 
what is good are substantially one and the same; they differ only in their place in the 
logical succession of realization. For whatever is good must first have been prudent’ 
(Pieper, p. 15). For both Aristotle and Aquinas, the virtue of prudence is of central 
importance. Pieper goes so far as to say that ‘the structural framework of Occidental 
Christian metaphysics as a whole stands revealed, perhaps more plainly than in any 
other single ethical dictum, in the proposition that prudence is the foremost of the 
virtues’ (p. 10). This thesis is largely an attempt to present Aristotle’s teachings on 
prudence. It seeks to situate his understanding of the notion of prudence within the 
context of his general understanding o f the ethical life and how to live well. It tries to 
face and to tease out some of the more important philosophical and exegetical problems 
that are encountered by any attempt to engage seriously with Aristotle’s views in this 
area. To a lesser extent, this thesis is an attempt to show how successful Aquinas was 
in penetrating Aristotle’s teachings on prudence, even though he was separated from 
Aristotle by more than 1,500 years and did not know Greek. In addition, all of 
Aristotle’s works had only become available in Latin translation in Aquinas’s own 
lifetime. This thesis also tries to indicate how Aquinas was not afraid on occasion to 
change and develop some of Aristotle’s views in this area. These two great thinkers, by 
their engagement with such issues as the relationship between the rational and the
emotional in human psychology, the relationship between the human and the divine, the 
community and the individual, the universal and the particular, intelligence and 
character, developed an understanding of prudence that far exceeds in scope and in 
depth the popular understanding of prudence in our culture. As Pieper indicates, the 
great gap between the teachings of Aristotle and Aquinas on prudence and the 
contemporary understanding of the concept may have a deeper significance. It may 
indicate that people ‘no longer feel the binding force of the Christian Occidental view of 
man. It may denote the beginning of an incomprehension of the fundamentals of 
Christian teaching in regard to the nature of reality’ (Pieper, p. 10). In my view, 
something very like the notion of prudence taught by Aristotle and Aquinas needs to be 
retrieved and given priority if individuals and communities are going to be successful in 
acting wisely and living well in our time.
Chapter Two of this thesis is an attempt to outline Aristotle’s understanding of
prudence. After listing and considering various sources, the focus is put on Book VI of
the Nicomachean Ethics. Various methodological issues are then addressed, e.g.,
Aristotle’s understanding of dialectic and the nature of moral knowledge. When
Aristotle considers prudence explicitly, perhaps the most distinctive aspect of his
teaching is the fundamental connection that he sees as existing between prudence and
the virtues of character. This connection and some of its implications are considered at
some length. For example, Aristotle denies that a person who is truly courageous can
be unjust. This is because he thinks that courage and justice -  like all the virtues of
character -  depend on prudence, which he regards as a unifying virtue. With the help of
prudence, the virtues of character or the moral virtues make it possible for a person to
bring the various non-rational elements in his make-up into harmony with reason, so
4
that he fulfils his function well and flourishes as a human being. For Aristotle, the 
person who fulfils his function well and who flourishes as a human being is one who 
attains eudaimonia or happiness. The role o f prudence as the virtue o f good decision 
making in this context is then examined.
Chapter Two also tries to explore some of the issues that the distinctions between 
prudence and craft, and action and production, give rise to -  issues on which some 
leading contemporary interpreters of Aristotle arc divided. A fundamental concern for 
Aristotle is to distinguish prudence from the other practical virtue of thought, i.e., craft 
or technical expertise, which is concerned with production rather than action. Although 
there are senses in which the two virtues are similar, Aristotle is clear that the person 
who exercises the virtue of prudence is not to be identified with the person who 
exercises a skill or a technique in a field such as building construction or medicine.
Another fundamental concern for Aristotle is the comparison and the contrast that can
be made between prudence and theoretical wisdom. The virtues of thought that are
theoretical are crucial in helping a person to acquire genuine knowledge of what
constitutes eudaimonia. Theoretical wisdom involves trying to look beyond the human.
It seeks to understand the first causes of the universe, i.e., the unmoved mover and the
various other intelligences that move the planets. Aristotle places himself very
deliberately in a tradition according to which the cosmos is controlled by divine beings.
The extent to which his conception of ethics is religious is considered. Also, the
implications for prudence and the ethical life of Aristotle’s elevation of theoretical
wisdom to a position o f pre-eminence among the virtues are examined at some length.
This is an issue on which there appears to be a decided lack of consensus in
5
contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. In this context, the attractiveness of the 
intellectualist interpretation that has been put forward by Richard Kraut is highlighted.
Lastly, in this chapter an attempt is made to show how Aristotle also develops his 
account of prudence by exploring its various relations to such matters as deliberation, 
decision and a special kind of perception. These complex relations, which go to the 
heart of Aristotle’s theory of action, serve to underline the holistic nature o f his 
understanding of practical rationality.
Chapter Three of this thesis is an attempt to outline Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of
Aristotle’s doctrine o f prudence as set out in his Sententia libri Ethicorum (usually
abbreviated SLE) or Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’. The
Nicomachean Ethics as a whole, and in particular Book VI on the intellectual virtues,
were not translated into Latin until the middle of the thirteenth century. By 1252,
Albert the Great had written his Super Ethica -  the first full Latin commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics. At this time, Aquinas was studying as a Dominican under Albert
at Cologne. It was about twenty years after this that he wrote his own commentary, i.e.,
the SLE. Although Aquinas’s commentary is a sententia and not an expositio or in-
depth study, the accuracy and profundity of the grasp of Aristotle’s teachings on
prudence that it reveals is immediately apparent. Much of Chapter Three is concerned
with the appraisal of Aquinas’s interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of prudence. It
seems reasonable to conclude that his interpretations are more accurate than, and indeed
represent improvements on, those advanced by other leading authorities of his time,
including Albert the Great in his Super Ethica. When this is recognized, it is possible to
discern Aquinas’s own views, and to appreciate their place in the mature development
6
of his thought. When some aspects of his treatment of prudence in the Summa 
Theologiae and in some of his other works are considered, the suggestion that the SLE 
is not just an interpretation of Aristotle but also an expression of Aquinas’s own views -  
and a developed and a mature expression at that -  gains further credence.
Having identified some aspects of Aquinas’s notion of prudence -  with particular 
reference to his SLE -  in Chapter Three, Chapter Four tries to compare and contrast the 
teachings on prudence o f these two great thinkers separated by more than a millennium 
and a half. At a first glance, they might appear as almost identical. However, this 
appearance is somewhat deceptive. One important difference is that Aquinas considers 
that Aristotle’s conception of ultimate end or eudaimonia cannot be realized perfectly in 
this life, and that this can be established from Aristotle’s own argument. Whether or 
not Aquinas’s concepts of synderesis and the will represent major innovations in his 
account as compared to that of Aristotle are not at all the straightforward issues that 
they were thought to have been in certain circles not so long ago. It is in his more 
theological works when Aquinas discusses prudence explicitly in the context of grace, 
God’s providence, and the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity -  thus going 
beyond Aristotle’s philosophical scope -  that he separates himself more significantly 
from the one he honours with the title, Philosophus. Any reappraisal of the significance 
of the traditional virtue of prudence has to begin from a careful study of the concept as 
conceived and developed by these two great thinkers. Hopefully, this thesis is a small 
step in this direction, preparing the way perhaps for a more extensive study in the area.
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CHAPTER TWO
PRACTICAL W ISDOM  
OR
PRUDENCE (PHRONÉSIS) 
IN
ARISTOTLE
8
2.1 SOURCES
2.1.1 The Ethical Treatises
The text of Aristotle on which most classic discussions o f practical wisdom or prudence 
are based is Book VI o f the Nicomachean Ethics, which is usually taken to correspond 
to Book V of the Eudemian Ethics. There is general agreement among scholars that 
Aristotle’s two major ethical treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian 
Ethics, have three books in common, Books V-VII of the former work (usually 
abbreviated NE) being taken to correspond to Books IV-VI of the latter work (usually 
abbreviated EE). Traditionally, the Nicomachean Ethics has been regarded as the 
definitive statement of Aristotle’s ethical theory, and the Eudemian Ethics has been 
viewed in comparison as an earlier, less important work. In recent decades, the 
traditional view has been strongly challenged, most notably by Anthony Kenny in his 
book, The Aristotelian Ethics.1 This work, which is a study of the relationship between 
Aristotle’s two great ethical treatises, sets out to undermine the traditional view 
concerning ‘the priority and inferiority of the Eudemian Ethics’ (ibid., p. 3). Nowadays, 
many scholars accept that the stylistic and doctrinal evidence linking the three common 
books with the Eudemian Ethics is strong. Christopher Rowe, in the historical 
introduction to his recently published translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
acknowledges that ‘if  the balance of opinion, and of the evidence, makes the Eudemian 
earlier than the Nicomachean, there is also something like the same balance in favour of
9 • • •an Eudemian origin for the “common” books’. This is a very striking statement
1 A n t h o n y  J . P . K e n n y ,  The A ris to te lia n  E thics, ( O x f o r d :  C l a r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 8 ) .
2 A r i s to t l e ,  N icom ach ean  E th ics, t r a n s .  b y  C h r i s t o p h e r  R o w e  ( w i th  H i s to r i c a l  I n t r o d u c t i o n ) ,  a n d  
P h i lo s o p h ic a l  I n t r o d u c t i o n  a n d  C o m m e n t a r y  b y  S a r a h  B r o a d ie ,  ( O x f o r d :  O x f o r d  U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  2 0 0 2 ) ,  
p .  4 .
considering that Christopher Rowe has been identified by Anthony Kenny as a principal 
and very able defender o f the traditional view (Kenny, p. vi).
The other important ethical treatise traditionally attributed to Aristotle, the Great Ethics 
or Magna Moralia, is nowadays regarded as probably the work of one of his students. 
Nevertheless, it is taken to be authentically Aristotelian. Of Aristotle’s other works, the 
Rhetoric and the Politics are also considered particularly significant in the context of his 
moral philosophy. Indeed, Aristotle sees the inquiry in his ethical treatises as part of the 
inquiry continued in the Politics. Already, in Chapter 2 of Book I of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, he makes it clear that he sees this whole work as a kind of political science.
For while it is satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good even for an 
individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve it for a people and 
for cities. And so, since our line of inquiry seeks these [goods, for an individual 
and for a community], it is a sort of political science.3 
Thus Aristotle does not make a sharp distinction between ethics and politics. The kind 
of political science that he investigates in the Nicomachean Ethics takes for granted the 
overall identification o f the moral and civic virtues in the good city-state or polis. For 
Aristotle as for Plato, the main purpose of political power is to help realize the good in 
the lives of free citizens. Although achieving it requires a context that is political and 
social, the good itself is realized only in individual lives and through the active 
involvement of individual citizens. Because the human good is Aristotle’s fundamental 
concept in this context, it can be stated that he views politics as a discipline that is 
continuous with ethics.
3 A r i s to t le ,  N icom ach ean  E thics, t r a n s .  b y  T e r e n c e  I r w in ,  2 nd e d n  ( I n d ia n a p o l i s / C a m b r i d g e :  H a c k e t t  
P u b l i s h i n g  C o m p a n y ,  I n c . ,  1 9 9 9 ) ,  1 0 9 4 M 0 - 1 1. F u r th e r  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h i s  e d i t i o n  o f  t h e  N icom ach ean  
E thics  a r e  g i v e n  a f t e r  q u o ta t i o n s  in  th e  t e x t  f o l lo w in g  B e k k e r ’s p a g e  a n d  l in e  s y s t e m .
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2.1.2 Book VI of the NE
In this study of Aristotle’s treatment of the virtue of practical wisdom or prudence 
(phronesis), the main focus will be on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. From the 
outset, it is important to be clear that the style of the book is rather casual. It does not 
attempt to treat of all matters related to practical wisdom in a structured or systematic 
way. Indeed, throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not see himself as 
someone theorizing about practical knowledge, but rather as someone demonstrating it. 
In Book VI, Aristotle is particularly concerned ‘to complete the account of moral 
excellence offered earlier’.4 He understands moral excellence as relating to a mean that 
accords with right reason {orthos logos)', it is the nature of this right reason in the 
context o f moral decision making that he now seeks to clarify. It is the truly prudent 
person who embodies this right reason that is specifically ethical.
2.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
2.2.1 The Dialectical Argument
In order ‘to grasp what prudence is’ (1140a25), Aristotle encourages his readers to 
study carefully the kinds of people who are regarded as prudent. We come to 
understand phronesis by watching closely the phronomoi, the people who are judged to 
be practically wise in the way they live their lives. It is very typical of Aristotle to 
begin an inquiry by discussing some commonly accepted beliefs and opinions {ta 
endoxd) about the subject, and to treat these very seriously, though not uncritically. 
Endoxa can be beliefs and opinions held by all or most people, or they can be beliefs 
and opinions held by some or most o f the wise, i.e., by philosophers. According to
4 S a r a h  B r o a d ie ,  E th ics w ith  A r is to tle , ( N e w  Y o r k /O x f o r d :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 1 ) ,  p . 1 8 6 .
Aristotle, beliefs and opinions supported by either of these kinds of authority are never 
completely wrong. ‘It is reasonable for each group not to be completely wrong, but to 
be correct on one point at least, or even on most points’ (1098b28-29). Frequently, 
Aristotle proceeds by investigating difficulties and puzzles (aporiai) concerning these 
commonly accepted beliefs and opinions; this method of proceeding is normally 
referred to as the dialectical argument. For Aristotle, dialectic is any rational inference 
based on probable premises. At the end of the process, he arrives at first principles, 
which are sometimes a refined and systematized version of the commonly accepted 
beliefs and opinions.
According to W.F.R. Hardie, the extent to which Aristotle makes use of dialectical 
argument in the Nicomachean Ethics should not be overstated.5 For the most part, he 
develops his arguments from premises that express his own beliefs and opinions, or 
beliefs and opinions that he has made his own. C.D.C. Reeve suggests that Hardie is 
mistaken in thinking that Aristotle’s own beliefs and opinions are not to be regarded as 
endoxa, and that they are not to be understood as coming under the umbrella of 
dialectic.6 ‘Arguments that begin from Aristotle’s own views [...] should not, for that 
reason alone, be characterized as not employing dialectical methods’ (Reeve, p. 36, n. 
58). Hardie seems to be on firmer ground when he suggests that Aristotle’s declared 
respect for commonly accepted beliefs and opinions needs to be considered in the light 
of his view that most people do not have a true conception of the kind of life that is best 
and make the life of pleasure their standard ideal (p. 38). ‘The many [...] would seem
5 W . F . R .  H a r d i e ,  A r is to t le ’s  E th ica l Theory, 2 nd e d n  ( O x f o r d :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 0 ) ,  p .  3 9 . 
H a r d i e  g o e s  o n  t o  c o n t r a s t  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  B u r n e t  a n d  G r e e n w o o d  o n  t h i s  i s s u e .  B u r n e t  h e ld  th a t  th e  
N icom ach ean  E th ics  w a s  ‘d i a l e c t i c a l  t h r o u g h o u t ’ ; G r e e n w o o d  r e g a r d e d  t h i s  v i e w  a s  a n  e x a g g e r a t io n .
6 C .  D . C .  R e e v e ,  P ra c tice s  o f  R eason: A r is to tle ’s  N icom ach ean  E th ics, ( O x f o r d :  C la r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 2 ) ,  
p p .  3 5 - 3 6 .
to conceive the good and happiness as pleasure, and hence they also like the life of 
gratification. In this they appear completely slavish, since the life they decide on is a 
life for grazing animals’ (1095M9-21). In contrast to W.F.R. Hardie, John M. Cooper 
regards Aristotle’s moral philosophy as being very dialectical in character.7
Even where the ‘opinions of the wise’, what we all say or think, and the other 
hallmarks of dialectic are not emphasized in the text, there seems no doubt that 
Aristotle conceives o f his procedure as for the most part dialectical. (Cooper, p. 
69)
In general, Cooper refers to dialectic as involving a kind of reasoning that is less formal 
than demonstration, which produces scientific proofs. Demonstration proceeds by the 
making of deductions from first principles that may be unfamiliar to most people. 
Unlike demonstration, dialectic takes as a starting point commonly accepted beliefs and 
reputable opinions, as has already been stated, and again, unlike demonstration, a 
dialectical argument often proceeds by asking questions. However, one of the 
fundamental characteristics of dialectical arguments as Aristotle understands them is 
that they are supposed to be valid. In a dialectical deduction just as much as in a 
demonstration, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. In a famous 
passage in Chapter 1 of Book VII, where Aristotle takes up the question of 
incontinence, he makes it clear that he regards dialectic as an important tool in 
philosophical inquiries in ethics.
As in the other cases, we must set out the appearances, and first o f all go through 
the puzzles. In this way we must prove the common beliefs [ . . . ] -  ideally, all the
7 J o h n  M . C o o p e r ,  R eason  a n d  H um an G o o d  in A ris to tle , ( I n d ia n a p o l i s :  H a c k e t t  P u b l i s h i n g  C o m p a n y ,  
I n c . ,  1 9 8 6 ) ,  p p .  6 9 - 7 0 .
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common beliefs, but if  not all, most of them, and the most important. For if the 
objections are solved, and the common beliefs are left, it will be an adequate 
proof. (1145b4-8)
2.2.2 Examples of Prudent People
As examples of people who are regarded as prudent, Aristotle gives Pericles, and, in 
general, household managers and politicians (1140b8-10). Richard Kraut warns against 
reading too much into such a reference.8 At this point, Aristotle is trying to distinguish 
prudence from other intellectual states such as craft or theoretical wisdom by paying 
attention to the people who are characterized as having prudence or practical wisdom. 
He should not be understood as committing himself to the thesis that Pericles in 
particular exemplified practical wisdom.
The point of his remark about Pericles is not that whatever practical wisdom is, it 
is something Pericles had but, rather, that this virtue is ascribed to people on the 
basis of the breadth of their concern: they try to achieve what is good in general 
and not this or that more specific good. (Kraut, Grand End, p. 370, n. 4)
Kraut’s point is supported by the fact that Aristotle seems to qualify his position as 
regards politicians at a later stage by making a contrast between them and people who 
are regarded as prudent. Prudent people mind their own business whereas politicians 
tend to be too active, he suggests (1142a 1-2). However, he goes on to acknowledge that 
being in a position to mind one’s own business presupposes a political system (1142a9). 
In directing our attention to the kinds of people who are regarded as prudent, Aristotle 
continues an approach he adopts earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics. For example, in
8 R i c h a r d  K r a u t ,  ‘ In  D e f e n s e  o f  t h e  G r a n d  E n d ’ , E th ics, V o l .  1 0 3 , N o .  2  ( J a n . ,  1 9 9 3 ) ,  3 6 1 - 3 7 4  (p .  3 7 0 ,  n .  
4 ) .
Book III, he refers to the excellent or virtuous person as one who ‘sees what is true in 
each case, being himself a sort of standard and measure’ (1113a33-34). He can be 
trusted to approve of the things that are genuinely good. Thus it can be argued that 
Aristotelian ethics is a practical enterprise that includes studying closely the kinds of 
people who are regarded as prudent and virtuous, and learning from them.
2.2.3 The Challenge of Dealing Adequately with the Complexity of Ethical Issues
As early as Chapter 3 of Book I, Aristotle warns us against expecting that the discussion 
o f ethical issues will be characterized by the degree o f precision that is found in other 
forms of discourse. ‘The educated person seeks exactness in each area to the extent that 
the nature of the subject allows; for apparently it is just as mistaken to demand 
demonstrations from a rhetorician as to accept [merely] persuasive arguments from a 
mathematician’ (1094b24-27). In Chapter 2 of Book II, Aristotle affirms his belief that 
‘every account of the actions we must do has to be stated in outline, not exactly’ 
(1104al-2). This applies to both a general account of actions and any account of a 
particular case. A general account is unable to do justice to the variations in obligation 
that arise from the widely differing circumstances that attend the performance of any 
action. Similarly, an account o f a particular case has to include so many details and 
qualifications - if  it is to fit the actual case - that it inevitably lacks simplicity, a quality 
Aristotle regards as essential for precision. In this context, Martha Nussbaum interprets 
Aristotle as suggesting that the specific ethical case can contain some elements that are 
non-repeatable or a particular that is ultimate or unique in some way.9
9 M a r th a  C . N u s s b a u m ,  ‘T h e  D i s c e r n m e n t  o f  P e r c e p t io n :  A n  A r i s to t e l i a n  C o n c e p t io n  o f  P r i v a te  a n d  
P u b l i c  R a t i o n a l i t y ’ , in  A r is to t le ’s  E th ics , e d .  b y  N a n c y  S h e r m a n  ( L a n h a m ,  M D :  R o w m a n  &  L i t t l e f i e l d  
P u b l i s h e r s ,  I n c . ,  1 9 9 9 ) ,  p p .  1 4 5 -1 8 1  ( p p .  1 6 2 -1 6 3 ) .
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The moderate diet for Milo the wrestler is not the same as the moderate diet for 
Aristotle (indeed, for any other human being), because Milo’s concrete, and 
presumably unique combination of size, weight, needs, goals and activity are all 
relevant to determining the appropriate for him. (Nussbaum, Discernment, p. 
162)
The particularity of love and friendship illustrates this point even more clearly. Aspects 
of shared history or a family relationship that are not even in principle repeatable are 
permitted to carry serious ethical weight. A particular situation might demand that a 
family member or friend be treated ‘as a unique non-replaceable being, a being not like 
anyone else in the world’ (ibid., p. 163). For Aristotle, to live a good life is to be 
involved in a dynamic project in which all the answers are not given in advance.
2.2.4 Knowledge and Right Reason in Aristotle’s Ethics
These difficulties regarding measurement and precision in ethical matters must not be
taken to mean that there is no genuine knowledge of principles and of how to apply
them in Aristotle’s understanding of ethics. Despite his many caveats about the lack of
precision in ethics, Aristotle also makes statements that are quite definite -  if not
absolute -  in character.
Now not every action or feeling admits o f the mean. For the names of some
automatically include baseness -  for instance, spite, shamelessness, envy [among
feelings], and adultery, theft, murder, among actions. For all of these and similar
things are called by these names because they themselves, not their excesses or
deficiencies, are base. Flence in doing these things we can never be correct, but
must invariably be in error. We cannot do them well or not well -  by committing
adultery, for instance, with the right woman at the right time in the right way. On
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the contrary, it is true without qualification that to do any of them is to be in error. 
(1107a9-l 7)
Aristotle is convinced that there is in every kind of situation a correct answer to the 
question o f how one should act, and that the person who acts in accord with right reason 
attains it. ‘First, then, actions should accord with the correct reason. That is a common 
[belief], and let us assume i f  (1103b32-33). The phrase -  in accord with correct or 
right reason (kata ton orthon logon) -  occurs repeatedly in the Nicomachean Ethics, and 
it always involves prudence either implicitly or explicitly.
Whenever people now define virtue, they all say what state it is and what it is 
related to, and then add that it is the state in accord with the correct reason. Now 
the correct reason is the reason in accord with prudence; it would seem, then, that 
they all in a way intuitively believe that the state in accord with prudence is 
virtue. (1144b23-26)
2.2.5 Purpose and Audience
The importance of two other features of Aristotle’s conception of method in the
Nicomachean Ethics needs to be underlined. Firstly, he does not see himself as a
theoretician. For him, the aim of ethics is not so much to know as to do. The objective
of the discussion is not to instruct us on the nature of virtue, but to show us how to live
well. ‘The purpose o f our examination is not to know what virtue is, but to become
good, since otherwise the inquiry would be of no benefit to us’ (1103b28-30).
Secondly, it is important to keep in mind the audience that Aristotle is addressing in his
discussion. Consisting o f men who have a certain experience and maturity, it is quite
specific. ‘A youth is not a suitable student of political science; for he lacks experience
of the actions in life [...] Moreover, since he tends to follow his feelings, his study will
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be futile and useless’ (1095a2-5). Aristotle’s students have to be ready to listen to 
reason in ethical matters, and they must not be unduly influenced by their emotions. 
‘For those who accord with reason in forming their desires and in their actions, 
knowledge of political science will be of great benefit’ (1095al 0-11). Also, it is 
assumed that Aristotle’s students have been well brought up and that they have acquired 
-  or are not far from acquiring -  the starting points of the subject. ‘Someone who is 
well brought up has the beginnings, or can easily acquire them’ (1095a8-9).
2.3 PRUDENCE AND CHARACTER VIRTUE
2.3.1 Ergon, Virtue and Reason
In Aristotle’s account of action, a key role is played by the concept of the ergon, a term 
that can be translated as the characteristic activity or function or work of a thing. A 
thing’s ergon is bound up with its essence and its virtue. In the case o f beings that are 
animate, the ergon corresponds to the type of soul the being has. A good knife is one 
that performs its ergon or function of cutting well. Knives are good in virtue of their 
possessing certain properties such as sharpness, rigidity, etc.. Those properties, which 
enable a thing to perform its ergon well, can be termed its virtues. A good human being 
is one who performs his ergon well, the human ergon being the ‘activity of the soul in 
accord with reason or requiring reason’ (1098a7-8). The virtues for a human being are 
those states, which, when they are activated, either express reason or require reason. 
Although Aristotle sees all the human virtues as reason-based, he makes a division 
between virtues of thought and virtues o f character. The virtues of thought are those 
that express reason, and they correspond to the rational part of the soul. They are ‘craft, 
scientific knowledge, prudence, wisdom, and understanding’ (1139bl6-17). In Greek,
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the respective terms are techne, epistémé, phronésis, sophia and nous, and these 
intellectual virtues are discussed in Book VI. The virtues of character are those that 
require reason, and they correspond to the non-rational part o f the soul. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives no definite listing of the character virtues. They 
are discussed in Books II-V, and among those included are courage (andreia), 
temperance (sophrosune), justice (dikaiosune), generosity (eleutheriotés), magnificence 
(megaloprepeia), magnanimity (megalopsuchia), mildness (praotés), wit (eutrapelia) 
and some virtues for which he claims there are no names.
The rational part and the non-rational or emotional part are different aspects of the one 
human soul. Although Aristotle sees the non-rational part as sharing in reason and as 
responsive to it, he does not regard the virtues of the two parts as overlapping. 
However, he makes one important exception here, and that is prudence. Although 
prudence is an intellectual virtue, it is closely associated with the character or moral 
virtues. The examination of the character virtues in Books 11-V shows that ‘each of 
them is a mode of emotional receptivity to the rule of reason’ (Kraut, Grand End, p. 
373). The role of prudence is crucial in enabling the moral virtues ‘to promote the 
domination of reason over every other aspect of human life’ (ibid., p. 374). Also, many 
Aristotelian commentators stress that it is important to consider the human ergon as a 
form of activity rather than as a distinctive kind of activity. According to this 
interpretation, Aristotle does not see the human ergon as being exclusively intellectual. 
‘He does not mean that a human being does or should concentrate on rational thinking
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rather than action; he means that a human being characteristically guides his actions by 
practical reason’.10
2.3.2 The Interdependence of Prudence and Character Virtue
The distinction between virtues of thought and virtues of character is misleading if it 
gives the impression that the two kinds can occur independently. Virtues or excellences 
of character are impossible without prudence, the most important of the virtues of 
thought for ethics. Virtues of character need the guidance of prudence to avoid the 
extremes of excess and deficiency, and to ensure that feelings and actions occur at the 
right time, concerning the right things, in respect of the right people, for the right 
reason, and in the right way (1106bl6-24). Also, prudence is impossible without 
excellence of character (1144a29ff.). Virtues are developed from natural capacities, 
which have to be turned in the right direction. Cleverness in action is not sufficient for 
prudence. The right ends have to be pursued. The prudent person (phronimos) needs 
the virtues of character, ‘for vice perverts us and produces false views about the 
principles of actions’ (1144b34-35). ‘A prudent person must also at the same time be 
excellent in character’ (1152al0).
Aristotle makes an important distinction between natural virtue (phusike arete) and full 
or perfect virtue {kuria arete). For example, courage can occur as a natural character 
virtue arising from a person’s natural dispositions or from his moral training. However, 
this kind of courage needs to be developed into a state necessarily including prudence 
(1144b 10-14). Courage as a full character virtue requires the agent to decide freely to
10 T e r e n c e  I r w in ,  ‘T h e  m e t a p h y s i c a l  a n d  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  b a s i s  o f  A r i s t o t l e ’s  E th ics',  in  E ssa ys  on  
A r is to t le ’s  E th ics, e d .  b y  A .O .  R o r t y  ( B e r k e le y :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n ia  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 0 ) ,  p p .  3 5 - 5 3  (p .  4 9 ) .
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perform the actions that develop the character state that is courage. The agent has to 
deliberate and freely choose the actions for their own sake, i.e., because they are truly 
good. ‘Full virtue cannot be acquired without prudence’ (1144bl7). Resulting from 
actions that are freely chosen and directed by prudence, it is the kind of virtue that 
makes a person ‘good without qualification’ (1145al). The form of choice involved 
here is more than simple choice (hairesis), i.e., choice without deliberation or decision. 
According to Aristotle, children and even animals are capable of simple choice. What 
is needed for full virtue is decision or rational choice (prohairesis), which always 
requires deliberation or rational calculation. Prohairesis literally means choosing 
before, the before having a preferential or a temporal meaning. Prohairesis is 
sometimes rendered preferential choice. As Aristotle himself points out, ‘decision 
involves reason and thought, and even the name itself would seem to indicate that [what 
is decided, prohaireton] is chosen [haireton] before \pro\ other things’ (1112al7-18). 
Because ‘the virtues are decisions of some kind, or [rather] require decision’ (1106a4- 
5), and because prudence is the virtue of good decision making, it can be stated that 
prudence is the source o f full character virtue.
2.3.3 The Reciprocity of the Virtues
Although Aristotle accepts that the natural virtues are separable, he insists that the full
or perfect virtues are inseparable (1144b32-1145a2). In rejecting the Socratic belief in
the unity and identity o f all the virtues, he does not argue directly. He maintains that
since each virtue is inseparable from prudence, and since prudence requires all the
virtues, the virtues require one another. In other words, they are connected in the sense
that they all need prudence. ‘One has all the virtues if and only if one has prudence,
which is a single state’ (1145a2). Full character virtue is acquired only by repeated
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decisions made ‘in accord with the correct reason. Now the correct reason is the reason 
in accord with prudence’ (1144b23-25). Because of the crucial role of prudence in 
ethical decision making, it can be argued that it is the decisive and most important 
virtue in Aristotle’s understanding of what living the good life involves.
2.3.4 Interpreting ‘the state in accord with the correct reason, (and) [...] the state 
involving the correct reason’ (1144b26-28)
Aristotle proceeds to point out that ‘in accord with the correct reason’ needs to be 
understood in an active sense. It is insufficient for the agent’s action to happen to be in 
accord with the correct reason or prudence; the agent must actually decide that the 
action to be done is virtuous. ‘For it is not merely the state in accord with the correct 
reason, but the state involving the correct reason, that is virtue. And it is prudence that 
is the correct reason in this area’ (1144b26-28). The agent has to engage personally in 
the process of deliberating or rationally calculating that leads to the decision. In the 
notes he provides to his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin offers a 
different interpretation o f these lines.
In distinguishing (a) ‘in accord with (kata) the correct reason’ from (b) ‘involving 
(meta) the correct reason’, Aristotle probably means to distinguish (a) actions on 
the virtuous person’s decision from (b) actions, based on instinctive reactions and 
feelings, that are not actions on decision, but still would not be what they are 
without his rational reflection and decision (cf. 1117a22). (Irwin, p. 254)
While accepting that the traditional interpretation of 1144b26-28 may be accurate, W. 
F. R. Hardie seems to lend some support to the kind of interpretation suggested by 
Irwin. He refers to an argument made by J. A. Smith in the Classical Quarterly in
1920. Smith’s argument was based on a grammatical point.
22
According to the usual interpretation Aristotle is saying that virtue is a disposition 
not merely in accordance with (kata) reason but accompanying (meta) reason. 
This makes virtue the subject of the sentence; but in the Greek text it is the 
predicate. (Hardie, p. 238)
Hardie proceeds to point out that, according to Smith, translating these lines literally 
would result in meta expressing a looser, and not a tighter, connection between virtue 
and wisdom compared to that expressed by kata. Smith reverses the generally accepted 
interpretation by arguing that ‘kata may convey not an external or accidental connection 
but an intimate and causal connection [...] Again he argues that meta (with), or ouk 
aneu (not without), does not naturally suggest immanence or an intimate necessary 
connection’ (ibid.). While Hardie is very sympathetic to Smith’s argument, he 
acknowledges that, in general, students of the Nicomachean Ethics have not been 
persuaded to abandon the generally accepted interpretation of 1144b26-28. His final 
word is that Aristotle ‘has left this important part of his doctrine without adequate 
elucidation’ (ibid., p. 239). In her commentary on Christopher Rowe’s translation of 
these lines, Sarah Broadie takes up a position close to the traditional interpretation. 
‘The disposition [to act] according to the correct prescription [kata ton orthon logon\ 
[...] fits a condition o f simple readiness to obey the right prescription’ (Broadie and 
Rowe, p. 383), she suggests. She goes on to state that ‘the disposition [to act] 
accompanied by the correct prescription [meta tou orthou logon]' simply adds an 
element of ‘se/^directedness’ (ibid.).
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2.4 PRUDENCE AND EUDAIMONIA
2.4.1 Reason and Eudaimonia
In general, Aristotle describes prudent people as people who have the capacity to 
‘deliberate finely’ (1140a26) about things that can contribute to their own fulfilment or 
happiness or well-being. Thus being practically wise or prudent is intimately bound up 
with eudaimonia or human well-being as the final goal of human beings. People who 
are prudent have a basic grasp of what constitutes the ideal of human fulfilment. For 
Aristotle, the things that are fine or just or right are actually determined by how they are 
related to eudaimonia or human well-being. In particular situations, people who are 
prudent are able to choose the action or actions that in practice best contribute to the 
realization of eudaimonia. ‘Prudence is a state grasping the truth, involving reason, 
concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being’ (1140b7). 
‘Actions are in every way right if  they express the reason that the actions of the 
phronimos express (1107al-2). And that reason is itself determined by what best 
promotes eudaimonia, (Reeve, p. 29). Reeve goes on to refer to eudaimonia as not just 
a first principle of ethics, but as ‘the quintessentially ethical first principle of ethics’ 
(ibid.). As interpreted by many scholars, Aristotle sees the virtues as being the major 
components of eudaimonia or human well-being. Other components include health, 
materia] resources, and a stable political framework. When Aristotle states that 
‘happiness is activity in accord with virtue’ (1177al2), he means the fulfilment of a 
person’s total potential, not just his actions. Activity (energia), which can also be 
rendered actualization, includes contemplative study (theoria), something that he 
sharply distinguishes from action {praxis).
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2.4.2 Practical Reason, Decision and Deliberation
For Aristotle, deliberating finely is an exercise in practical reasoning. Such reasoning is 
termed practical because it results in action. Practical reason itself has two aspects: the 
rational choice or decision (prohairesis) on which an agent acts, and the process of 
deliberation by which such a choice or decision is made. Choices are made and actions 
are done for reasons. The underlying assumption here is that the link between intellect 
and action is a causal one. When a choice is of X for the sake of Y, establishing Y as 
the reason shows more clearly what choice the agent is making in choosing X and what 
he is doing when he acts on his choice. As Joseph Raz puts it in the book, Practical 
Reasoning, of which he is the editor, ‘Reasons are the corner-stone of all explanation of 
human actions, indeed of the very notion of human action itse lf.11 An agent’s rational 
choice can be evaluated in two complementary ways. If his choice is of X for the sake 
of Y, Y may or may not be an appropriate end, and X may or may not be an appropriate 
means. Giving Y as the reason might be the beginning of an argument to show that X is 
a good action as compared with other possibilities. For Aristotle, the end or reason of a 
rational choice is an integral part of it and not just an additional fact about it.
Aristotle is keenly aware o f the uniqueness of human beings as rational animals. In his 
view, an action that is done from the kind of impulse that sees no further than its 
immediate physical expression, leading to instant satisfaction, is not a truly human 
action. The desire-perception-action scheme that he uses to describe animal behaviour 
is not able to do justice to the experience of human action. Much more is involved in 
the link between the intellect of the human agent and his action than the making of a 
simple connection between perception by the intellect o f something good and the
11 P ra c tic a l R easoning, e d .  b y  J o s e p h  R a z  ( O x f o r d :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 7 8 ) ,  p .  2 .
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activation o f appetite resulting in action. Among other things, Aristotle’s account has to 
make room for whatever it is that enables a human agent to be held accountable for his 
actions. In order to differentiate human action from animal behaviour, he introduces 
three elements between desire and action. These three elements are deliberation, 
perception and choice. Thus the entire process can be represented as a desire- 
deliberation-perception-choice-action scheme.
2.4.3 The Nature of Deliberation
Deliberation is reasoning in a practical way about what the human agent can do. 
Although it presupposes a determinate end and considers how this can be attained, 
deliberation is basically concerned with means rather than ends. Like the 
mathematician who works back from the problem to be solved to an easier problem 
whose solution would help him to solve the other, and so on until he reaches one he is 
able to solve with the knowledge he already has, the deliberating agent works back from 
the end to the means and continues back further to the means to the means and keeps 
going until he reaches a means that can be adopted here and now.
We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends [...] we lay down the 
end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it. If it appears that any of 
several [possible] means will reach it, we examine which of them will reach it 
most easily and finely; and if only one [possible] means reaches it, we examine 
how that means will reach it, and how the means itself is reached, until we come 
to the first cause, the last thing to be discovered. For a deliberator would seem to 
inquire and analyze in the way described, as though analyzing a diagram [...]. 
And the last thing [found] in the analysis would seem to be the first that comes 
into being. (1112b 12-24)
2 6
Thus the last step in the process becomes the first to be taken in fact. The deliberation 
phase yields to the perception phase. The agent sees that X can be done here and now. 
The process is brought to completion by the choice to do X followed by the action.
We have found, then, that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those 
up to us, we deliberate about and [consequently] desire to do. Hence also 
decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us; for when we 
have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord 
with our wish. (1113al0-14)
Thus rational choice or decision is the culmination of deliberation and the starting point 
of action. As such, it is both pre-eminently rational and inescapably practical.
2.4.4 Ends and Means
In Aristotle’s understanding, the end that is sought is posited by ‘deliberative desire’ 
(1139a23). The role o f the character virtues is crucial in determining that the right end 
is desired. The calculation o f the means to the right end is supplied by deliberative or 
practical reasoning. However, Aristotle’s saying that deliberation is ‘not about ends, 
but about what promotes ends’ (1112bl 1-12), should not be interpreted too narrowly. 
What is an end in one context, and so not deliberated about there, is a means in another, 
where it is subject to deliberation. Thus an end can be deliberated about and chosen as 
the means to a higher end. Also, two ends can be in conflict. The conflict can be either 
partial or total. The agent can only resolve the conflict satisfactorily by deliberating 
about both ends to see which is higher. Ultimately, all ends, except an agent’s highest 
end, are means to that end. The highest or ultimate end is the agent’s conception of 
what kind of life is best. According to Aristotle, this is beyond deliberation and so
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cannot be attained by deliberative reasoning. In his book, Reason and Human Good in 
Aristotle, John M. Cooper strongly supports this interpretation.
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle held that the practically intelligent person 
knows by some kind of intellectual intuition what the correct ultimate end is. 
This is something he knows, but he does not know it either by having worked it 
out by deliberation or by having deduced it from the first principles of any 
theoretical science. (Cooper, p. 64)
Thus although the desire for the right end is dependent on the character virtues and the 
calculation of the means to that end is supplied by deliberative or practical reasoning, 
the agent’s ultimate end is the object of what might be called a practical intuition.
In her book, The Fabric of Character, Nancy Sherman challenges Cooper’s view that 
the deliberative process works towards an ultimate end established by the virtuous 
person through intuition.12 She argues ‘that the process of dialectically arriving at such 
an end is continuous with the process of determinately constructing, through 
deliberative choice, a conception of the good life’ (ibid., p. 10). In other words, the 
ultimate end is shaped to some extent by the deliberative process. A large part of the 
work of reasoning about ends involves reconstituting and revising ends through action. 
It is not so much a question o f the agent deciding at the start that something like health 
or alleviating suffering matters to him, but rather a question of his being able to work 
out, through a whole series of encounters with the world, how it concerns him, to what 
extent, when, and towards whom. It is issues such as these that the agent addresses 
when he acts, and it is such issues that give content to an end. ‘To deliberate about 
what contributes to an end includes specification and qualification of the end’
12 N a n c y  S h e r m a n ,  The F a b r ic  o f  C h aracter,  ( O x f o r d :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 9 ) .
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(Sherman, p. 88). Aristotle states that the prudent person knows how to deliberate 
‘about what sorts of things promote living well in general’ (1140a28). His concern is 
with the whole of good living, and not just its parts. Sherman interprets this as 
providing explicit evidence that for Aristotle ‘the concerns o f deliberation span widely 
enough to include the overall ends of character’ (p. 88). She goes on to acknowledge 
that at least a preliminary conception of the end is needed to get deliberation started. At 
1142al4-15, Aristotle points out that ‘particulars become known from experience, but a 
young person lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it’. An 
important part o f gaining that necessary experience ‘consists precisely in making 
deliberative choices. Through such choices, an agent comes to qualify and refine ends 
as they find their place beside other ends in a life’ (Sherman, p. 89). Her remark in the 
very next sentence ‘that this comprehensive understanding is in part the achievement of 
nous or practical insight’ (ibid.) suggests to me that her position is really not very far 
removed from that put forward by Cooper.
2.4.5 Decision, Deliberation and the Ultimate End
According to Aristotle, the human agent who chooses rationally is one who keeps the 
ultimate end in view. There has to be a sense in which he is aiming at the best. For 
Aristotle, this is a sine qua non for rational choice or decision. The fact that the agent 
might engage in practical reflection and calculate carefully the means to a goal is not in 
itself sufficient for the formation of a rational choice. Thus Aristotle distinguishes 
between excellence in deliberation in an unqualified sense and excellence in 
deliberation in a particular case. Strictly speaking, the human agent acting for the best 
without qualification is the one who exercises rational choice or decision in the true 
sense. Referring to this point, Aristotle himself writes:
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Our deliberation may be either good without qualification or good only to the 
extent that it promotes some [limited] end. Hence unqualifiedly good deliberation 
is the sort that correctly promotes the unqualified end [i.e., the highest good], 
while the [limited] sort is the sort that correctly promotes some [limited] end.
(1142b29-33)
2.5 PRUDENCE AND CRAFT
2.5.1 Craft, Production and Action
One of Aristotle’s main concerns in Book VI o f the Nicomachean Ethics is to 
distinguish the kind of action governed by rational choice from the activity of craft. He 
cites building as an example of craft or technical expertise, and he describes it as 
‘essentially a certain state involving reason concerned with production’ (1140a6). He 
sees it as involving inquiry and a certain kind of deliberation. Building is an example of 
an art or a craft that enables its practitioner to know what steps to take so as to bring 
into being something material, i.e., a building. Another favourite example of art or craft 
for Aristotle is medicine, even though what the medical practitioner tries to bring into 
being might be considered as something immaterial, i.e., health. Considering the 
builder in the abstract, it can be said that his ultimate end is nothing other than the 
construction of fine buildings. However, for Aristotle, his technical deliberation as a 
builder is not deliberation, strictly speaking, and his choosing of certain materials, tools 
and methods for a particular building project is only rational choice in a qualified sense. 
Thus he is quite strict in the way he limits rationally choosing to the sphere of the moral 
agent acting for the best without qualification. This leads him to distinguish sharply 
between what he calls production (poiesis) and what he calls action (praxis).
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2,5.2 Craft, Production and the Use of Capacities -  A Contrast with Prudence
A craft such as building is a rational discipline concerned with production. As such, it 
is a capacity that can be correctly or incorrectly used. A builder can be either good or 
bad from the point of view of technical expertise. On the other hand, practical wisdom, 
being concerned with action rather than production, requires the correct use of a 
capacity. For Aristotle, a person cannot be prudent or practically wise without at the 
same time being good. In his view, there is no scope for making a distinction between a 
good and a bad exercise of practical wisdom. Thus the prudent or practically wise 
person does not simply practise a craft. ‘Skills can be misused, at will, to produce poor,
< 1Tshoddy, and at times morally grotesque results: practical wisdom cannot’. It cannot be 
misused because by definition it entails doing what is morally good. Also, a person is 
oriented towards living a fulfilled life ‘by natural necessity’ (ibid.). However, practical 
wisdom and craft can still be compared because they both involve a certain theoretical 
understanding, and they both essentially consist ‘in the ability to apply such an 
understanding in individual situations’ (ibid., p. 93).
After stating that ‘there is virtue [or vice in the use] of craft, but not [in the use] of
prudence’ (1140b22), Aristotle goes on to point out that ‘in a craft, someone who makes
errors voluntarily is more choiceworthy; but with prudence, as with the virtues, the
reverse is true’ (1140b23-24). The point here seems to be that a person cannot both be
temperate, for example, and act voluntarily in an intemperate way. However, a person
can be an accomplished craftsman and yet deliberately misuse his skill. Indeed, in
certain circumstances, it can be entirely acceptable for a craftsman to make errors
freely. Sherman gives the example of a tennis coach using his skill to demonstrate how
13 G e r a r d  J .  H u g h e s ,  A ris to tle  on E th ics, ( L o n d o n :  R o u t l e d g e ,  2 0 0 1 ) ,  p .  9 1 .
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to hit a bad forehand shot (p. 180 n. 19). This could be part of a teaching point. It is 
less acceptable ‘to misuse virtue. Indeed it is unlikely that full virtue can be misused’ 
(ibid.). Also, proficiency in a craft does not depend on being disposed to practise the 
craft or wanting to practise it. Indeed, a person’s skills can become rusty or lost 
altogether through lack of use (1140b29). The same cannot happen with prudence. 
Because it is about human goods, we do not find ourselves without opportunities to use 
prudence — such that we might forget it. Thus prudence or practical wisdom is quite 
different from craft. Nevertheless, Aristotle also draws our attention to certain 
similarities between them. He sees both as intellectual and having to do with contingent 
things. In a certain sense, they both involve deliberating and acting on the basis of a 
specific picture of the end. They are very different in that practical wisdom is 
inseparable from excellence o f character; it is concerned with the specifically human 
good.
2.5=3 The Grand End Theory of Prudence
As has already been stated, the prudent person is one who seeks to realize the highest or 
best good. A difficult question is whether Aristotle takes it for granted that the moral 
agent has a true explicit picture of this highest good during the process of deliberation. 
The prudent person’s concern is with living well in general, and not with a restricted 
good such as health promotion or strength development. For Aristotle, aiming at living 
well as a whole or living well in general is the same as having eudaimonia or happiness 
as the objective of human action. As a point of departure, this conception of the end 
might seem rather indefinite. In Book VI, Aristotle makes no attempt to articulate what 
the telos or end is like. We know from other places that he regards theoria or
contemplative study as the highest of all activities for a human being, but he
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consistently denies this any practical application or interest. Sarah Broadie asserts that 
‘few of us would claim to know either at first or second hand what it is like to deliberate 
with a view to realising a Grand End’ (Ethics with Aristotle, p. 198), and that it is 
regrettable that Aristotle himself gives us so few examples or concrete descriptions of 
deliberation. Indeed, most of the ones that he does give are really examples of technical 
deliberation. She goes on to take issue with John M. Cooper, Anthony Kenny, Alasdair 
MacIntyre and others, because they attribute to Aristotle what she calls ‘a Grand End. 
theory o f practical wisdom’ (ibid., p. 199).
In practice, Aristotle seems not to hold always for a single fixed end that justifies every 
rational choice. We have his famous saying that ‘questions about actions and 
expediency, like questions about health, have no fixed answers’ (1104a4). Broadie 
makes a strong case for a version of practical wisdom that she terms ‘ground-level’ 
(Ethics with Aristotle, p. 200), and that does not depend on a grasp of philosophical 
ethics or an illumination from a divine realm. Even though people do develop 
substantial conceptions of the human good which can serve as a yardstick to guide 
behaviour, these ‘grand conceptions are not developed prior to the making of wise 
rational choices’ (ibid., p. 204). On this view, it is sufficient to think of living well in 
general as an unqualified good in the sense of there being in the moral agent a complete 
openness to any consideration that might be relevant in deciding what to do. ‘The 
limitless nature o f prohairetic choice consists in openness to possible revision bit by bit 
from any quarter, not in mythical adherence to an exhaustive plan that encodes the 
grounds of every pro and con simultaneously and in advance’ (ibid., p. 211). Thus the 
practical agent operates in an open-ended manner, constantly having to revise his
deliberation to take account of new factors or to judge that they are not relevant. In this,
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he differs from the craftsman whose focus is by definition restricted. Having to operate 
with fixed terms of reference, the craftsman always includes some considerations and 
permanently excludes others.
In his review essay on Sarah Broadie’s book, Ethics with Aristotle, which is entitled In 
Defense o f  the Grand End, and which has already been cited, Richard Kraut strongly 
defends the Grand End view of practical wisdom. He regards an argument concerning 
the justification o f decisions as central to the Grand End view. The person who is 
practically wise is able to justify his decisions in a way that includes a correct 
conception of happiness or eudaimonia. This is not to suggest that ‘the best moral agent 
is someone who mentally says to himself, at every waking moment, “Happiness consists 
in such-and-such; let me see, now, what I must do in these particular circumstances to 
achieve i f ” (Kraut, Grand End, p. 362). The person of practical wisdom is like a doctor 
who does not have to begin his medical deliberations by consciously reminding himself 
that health is good. Nevertheless, the decisions of the practically wise person have to be 
grounded either explicitly or implicitly in his conception of happiness; and it is in this 
sense that practical wisdom can be compared to a craft such as medicine, the end of 
which is a specific goal that serves as the starting point for all medical thinking. One of 
Kraut’s most telling arguments against Broadie’s interpretation is that her position 
makes the ideal deliberator a reactor rather than an actor.
Such a person notices something specific in his immediate surroundings or 
situation, and this activates a desire for an intermediate-level end. If this is the 
whole story, then the ideal deliberator is always reacting to this or that situation 
but has no general plan for shaping his environment. (Kraut, Grand End, p. 366, 
n. 2)
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A picture of life at its best has to include a plan for initiating action, and ‘such a plan 
should begin with a conception of where our good lies’ (ibid.), and should hardly be 
confined to intermediate goals.
2.5.4 Deliberation -  A Structure of Reasoned Explanation
Broadie goes on to take issue with Aristotle himself because he identifies practical 
wisdom so much with deliberating well. ‘Good deliberation is only one of its 
manifestations and should not be made the central issue’ (Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 
p. 211). He should have put the focus more on practical intelligence working well, she 
suggests. The moral agent only needs to deliberate when he is unsure as to what to do 
or how to respond. Quite often, practical intelligence has no need to deliberate. Many 
virtues -  friendliness would be an example -  are frequently exhibited in contexts that 
are not thought out or planned beforehand. In certain situations, the most appropriate 
response might be a feeling not expressed in action. ‘These difficulties have led many 
commentators to the view that “deliberation” in Aristotle refers not to a psychological 
process but to the structure of reasoned explanation which is at least potentially present 
in the rationale of the agent’s response’ (Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, p. 79). Thus the 
agent can, if challenged, give reasons as to why he did or felt this rather than something 
else without it being necessarily true that he considered other options or needed to think 
out how to respond.
2.5.5 Distinguishing Production and Action
As has already been stated, Aristotle makes a sharp distinction between practical 
wisdom and any kind of craft or productive capability. ‘For production has its end in
something other than itself, but action does not, since its end is acting well itself
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(1140b6-7). The product is other than the producer and his work of producing. As 
what it is, for example, a good or a bad building, it stands as something by which the 
producer and his producing can be judged. When it comes to action, there is nothing by 
which the action can be judged as an instance of acting well apart from the action itself. 
It cannot be judged as a productive capability is judged. The particular features of a 
product are external and accidental to its nature as a product. However, this does not 
hold for action.
The particulars of an action belong to its essence as action, since these are 
features of what it is that is judged good or not. The verdict depends on the when, 
the where, the agent’s relations with those affected, the foreseeable consequences, 
the cost, the alternatives sacrificed, etc. (Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, p. 209)
In the case of action, there always has to be deliberation in some form. ‘Deliberation 
decides whether to do a certain thing; the decision is never taken care of by the 
description of what might be done’ (ibid., p.210). With production, deliberation and 
practical ingenuity can become redundant as rules and set procedures are established. 
In the sphere of practical wisdom, deliberation is always present; its place can never be 
taken by rules.
Aristotle’s distinction between action and production raises certain difficulties. His 
statement that ‘goal-directed thought concerned with action [...] is also the principle of 
productive thought’ (1139b 1) suggests a connection as well as a distinction. What the 
agent produces is immediately related to and indeed explained by his action, what he 
decides to do. The actions which are the focus o f ethics -  honourable or kind actions 
which the good person does for their own sake, because he sees that to act in such a
manner is to live well -  these same actions may be productions in the most literal sense.
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In building a house, the builder -  as well as exercising a craft and producing something 
material -  may be keeping a promise and thereby, acting honourably. The agent’s kind 
action may be preparing a meal for a needy person. Distinguishing performances that 
are actions from performances that are productions is not at all straightforward. Many 
performances appear to take in both action and production. While the two can be 
distinguished conceptually, the overlap between them in actual life is considerable. Yet 
Aristotle seems to deny this. ‘Nor is one included in the other; for action is not 
production, and production is not action’ (1140a5-6). Unlike J.L. Ackrill,14 whose 
position on this issue has formed the basis for the discussion up to this point, Sarah 
Broadie sees no real problem here. She understands Aristotle as holding the view that 
action is not essentially production, and that production is not essentially action. She 
goes on to state that it is easy to come up with an argument and practical examples in 
support of this claim. ‘An instance o f fine production is not necessarily one of good 
conduct, as when excellent clothes are produced fast and cheaply through the use of 
child labour’ (Broadie and Rowe, p. 366).
2.5.6 The Primacy of Action and Practical Reason
Aristotle goes on to state that ‘every producer in his production aims at some [further] 
goal’ (1139b2). The work of producing is for the sake of its object, the tiling produced, 
and the thing produced is for the sake of something further, i.e., the using o f it. 
According to W.D. Ross, the work of all art or craft is the means ‘ultimately to some 
form of action (as opposed to making) which is its own end; thus art is subordinate to
14 J . L .  A c k r i l l ,  A ris to tle  the P h ilo sop h er, ( O x f o r d :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 1 ) ,  p p .  1 4 2 -1 4 3  & 1 5 3 -  
1 5 4 .
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practical reason’.15 Although Aristotle’s focus in this context is very much on 
instrumental or useful making or producing, craft also includes fine art. Ross goes on to 
point out that the use o f fine art ‘might be supposed to be aesthetic contemplation, but 
there is no clear evidence that Aristotle thought of this as an end in itself (ibid.).
2.6 ACTION AND DECISION
2.6.1 The Two Parts of the Rational Soul
Another main concern of Aristotle in Book YI is to explain the nature of practical 
wisdom by comparison and contrast with theoretical wisdom. He understands 
theoretical wisdom as excellence in realms of knowledge that are abstract and capable 
of being made exact. Its objects are necessary and universal. Practical wisdom, on the 
other hand, is concerned with contingent particulars that are imprecise and non-abstract. 
Theoretical wisdom is the excellence of the rational part of the soul that is scientific. 
Practical wisdom is the excellence of the part that is rationally calculating. Already, in 
Chapter 1 of Book VI, Aristotle sees the two virtues as quite distinct. ‘Hence we should 
find the best state of the scientific part and the best state o f the rationally calculating 
part; for this state is the virtue of each of them’ (1139al6-17). In subdividing the 
rational soul into a scientific or theoretical part and a calculating or practical part, 
Aristotle is underlining the fact that he sees the ethical right reason or orthos logos as 
different from its theoretical counterpart. And yet, he is affirming that the doing or not 
doing of human actions that are contingent is a fitting task for the highest human 
faculty.
15 W . D . R o s s ,  A ris to tle ,  3 rd e d n  ( L o n d o n :  M e th u e n  &  C o .  L td . ,  1 9 3 7 ) ,  p . 2 1 7 .
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2.6.2 Decision as Deliberative Desire
Despite having subdivided the human soul into different parts, Aristotle proceeds in 
Chapter 2 of Book VI to bring sense perception, thought and desire together. ‘There are 
three [capacities] in the soul -  sense perception, understanding, desire -  that control 
action and truth’ (1139al 7-18). He immediately makes it clear that he regards the role 
of sense perception (aisthesis) as secondary. ‘Of these three, sense perception is clearly 
not the principle of any action, since beasts have perception, but no share in action’ 
(1139al8-20). Although Aristotle holds that non-human animals act voluntarily 
(111la26), he is very clear that they are not capable of rational choice or decision. 
‘Decision [...] is [...] not the same as the voluntary, which extends more widely. For 
children and the other animals share in voluntary action, but not in decision’ (111 lb8- 
10). In Chapter 2 of Book VI, Aristotle identifies thought (dianoia) and desire (orexis) 
very closely.
As assertion and denial are to thought, so pursuit and avoidance are to desire. 
Now virtue of character is a state that decides; and decision is a deliberative 
desire. If, then, the decision is excellent, the reason must be true and the desire 
correct, so that what reason asserts is what desire pursues. This, then, is thought 
and truth concerned with action. (1139a21-26)
Thus Aristotle affirms that desire’s pursuit of its object is equivalent to assertion in the 
realm of thought, and that in decision or rational choice, there is harmony between what 
is asserted and what is pursued. In the case of an action that is decided upon, both 
thought and desire are involved in affirming that it is good and to be done. For 
Aristotle, an action that is contingent and particular can be regarded not only as right 
and good but also as true. Furthermore, it can be said that he sees reason as making a
contribution to motivation itself by giving the pursuit of desire a definite direction. As
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he himself writes, ‘the function of what thinks about action is truth agreeing with 
correct desire. The principle of an action -  the source of motion, not the goal -  is 
decision; the principle of decision is desire and goal-directed reason’ (1139a30-33).
For Aristotle, it is very important that decision or rational choice be understood as a 
combination of thought (dianoia) and desire (orexis) concerning the same thing. For 
‘decision is either understanding combined with desire or desire combined with 
thought’ (1139b4-5). And, as he has already declared in Chapter 2 of Book VI, 
‘decision is a deliberative desire (orexis bouleutikef (1139a23). The connection 
between thought and desire here should not be seen as a desire for some objective 
combined with a judgment that the doing of a particular action would bring it about. 
Rather thought identifies a particular action that is to be done and desire is the readiness 
to do it. ‘Thus thought and desire together affirm a prescription: thought affirms it in 
response to the need for guidance on the part of the desiderative side, and desire affirms 
it by way of acceptance’ (Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, p. 220). One implication of 
Aristotle’s mode of acceptance account of desire is that it avoids reducing the notion of 
good to that of desire. In this context, David Charles quotes a line from Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. ‘We desire because it seems good to us rather than it seems good to us 
because we desire it’ (1072a29).16 It is also noteworthy that Aristotle’s account does 
not focus desire exclusively on the pleasant.
2.6.3 Decision and Rational Wish
Also in Chapter 2 of Book VI, Aristotle makes a distinction between thought by itself
and goal-directed thought. ‘Thought by itself moves nothing, what moves us is goal-
16 D a v id  C h a r l e s ,  A r is to tle ’s  P h ilo so p h y  o f  A ction ,  ( L o n d o n :  G e r a ld  D u c k w o r th  &  C o .  L td . ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  p .  8 6 .
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directed thought concerned with action’ (1139a35-36). In his notes on this section, 
Terence Irwin points out that Aristotle leaves several questions unanswered (p. 240). Is 
desire prior to all thought or reasoning? Is goal-directed thought only of secondary 
importance compared to this desire? Or can goal-directed thought itself produce the 
relevant desire? A further complication is the fact that the desire needed for decision is 
not just any kind of desire. It cannot be appetite (epithumia) or spirit (thumos) because 
they belong to the non-rational part of the soul. This is not to deny the fact that 
Aristotle sees the non-rational part as sharing ‘in reason in a way, insofar as it both 
listens to reason and obeys it’ (1102b32-33). Thus the sensitive or desiderative part of 
the human soul, though non-rational, is responsive to reason and essentially related to it. 
Irwin suggests that the desire needed for decision is rational wish (boulesis) aiming at 
the good. ‘Goal-directed reason might refer to the reasoning on the basis of which we 
come to believe that x is good for its own sake and hence form a wish for x’ (p. 240). 
According to Broadie, although the kind of desire needed for decision is closely related 
to wish, it ‘is not wish [...] because we wish for things at a practical distance and even 
for what is impossible’ {Ethics with Aristotle, p. 220). At an earlier stage in his notes, 
Irwin acknowledges that Aristotle never makes it completely explicit that a decision 
must be based on a wish (p. 205). However, he does seem to imply it. What he 
explicitly rejects is the identification of decision with wish (1111 b20).
2.6.4 Desire and Action
In her book, The Fragility o f  Goodness, Martha C. Nussbaum makes the point that 
although much research has been done on the meaning and origin of various 
Aristotelian terms that have been added to the philosophical lexicon, the extent to which
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desire or orexis is a term Aristotle himself created has been largely unrecognized.17 She 
suggests that we need to ‘recover a sense o f the philosophical newness and strangeness 
of this word’ (ibid., p. 275), which never occurs in Plato’s writings. As Aristotle uses it, 
desire or orexis always implies a connection with an object, an orientation towards 
something in the environment. Also, it is more active than passive. The word suggests 
‘a complex responsiveness that receives from the world and in turn focuses itself 
outwards towards the world’ (ibid., p. 274). No animal movement or human action can 
take place without the active presence of some form of orexis in the agent. However, in 
the De Anima, it has to be admitted that Aristotle sometimes writes as if  there are 
human actions that can be produced by thought winning out over orexis (ibid., p. 487). 
As we have already seen, rational wish (boulesis), appetite (epithumia), and spirit 
(thumos) are all to be understood as forms of orexis.
For Aristotle, the notion of orexis is intrinsically bound up with the notion of a lack of 
self-sufficiency or completeness, and with an awareness o f that lack. Unlike an inert 
object such as a rock or a perfected god, animals ‘are not self-sufficient, but the sorts of 
beings that go for items which they see and imagine -  and not for any of these, but just 
for the ones towards which, having a need, they inwardly strain’ (Nussbaum, Fragility 
o f  Goodness, p. 276). Nussbaum suggests that Aristotle’s invention of the term, orexis, 
has had the effect of demystifying human action by enabling it to be seen as similar to 
animal motions. ‘Like them it is a selective reaching-out, and like them it goes after 
objects that are seen to have a certain relation to the animal’s needs. Animals look less 
brutish, humans more animal’ (ibid.). Although Aristotle almost always regards desire
17 M a r th a  C .  N u s s b a u m ,  The F ra g ility  o f  G o odn ess, r e v .  e d n  ( C a m b r id g e :  C a m b r i d g e  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  
2 0 0 1 ) ,  p. 2 7 3 .
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or orexis as essential for all animal movement and human action, he never sees orexis as 
acting independently. The cognitive elements -  perception and thought -  are also 
essential. He regards orexis and cognitive activities as very closely related conceptually 
and as combining to cause movement and action.
The human being is taken to be a creature of love and desire, even in his or her 
rational action. But desire is not something altogether brutish: it involves 
selective focusing upon objects in the world and an equally selective set of 
responses to that focusing. (Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p. 289)
Like non-human animals, human beings are neither spontaneously self-moving nor 
acted upon from without; ‘we all reach out, being incomplete, for things in the world. 
That is the way our movements are caused’ (ibid.).
2.6.5 A Desire-based Theory of Action
In general, it can be stated that Aristotle’s theory of action is very much desire-based. 
In his view, human action cannot be explained adequately in terms of knowledge and 
Ideological factors on their own. As has already been pointed out, he refers to rational 
choice or decision as ‘deliberative desire’ (1139a23). For him, to desire is to be active 
towards the good. Indeed, desire can be characterized as the immediate efficient cause 
of action. As I take a glass of water in my hand so as to have a drink, it is my desire to 
have a drink that is the efficient cause o f my reaching out my arm. And my goal to 
satisfy my thirst or propose a toast is the final cause. Thus Aristotle understood ‘action 
in terms of efficient causality and knowledge, and regarded the presence of teleological 
factors (if any) as compatible with desires being efficient causes o f action’ (Charles, p. 
59).
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Nancy Sherman also stresses the desire-based nature of Aristotle’s theory of action. ‘In 
an unequivocal way, Aristotle is a theorist for whom reasons for action must be desire- 
based’ (Sherman, p. 61). She goes on to make a helpful distinction between an agent’s 
desires as such and the objects of the agent’s desires.
It is not an agent’s desires per se that are among his reasons, since reasons are 
considerations which move one, and it is less an agent’s awareness of his affective 
state that moves him than an awareness of the objects of his desires, (ibid., p. 62) 
Because I am conscious of a feared object, for example, a dangerous bull, and not 
because I notice that I have a feeling of fear, I do not go into the field in which this bull 
is grazing. My feeling of fear corresponds to the object; it has ‘intentional content’ 
(ibid.). I act in a certain way because of how I see, imagine or conceive the object, and 
this is immediately related to my desire or desiderative state. My reason for acting 
focuses on the object of my desire -  something to be avoided or pursued -  and not so 
much on the desire itself. Also, it is noteworthy that an agent’s affective or desiderative 
state does not have to be heightened for an action to occur. Indeed, it is to be expected 
that most o f the time he acts routinely without any great feelings of fear or pleasure. 
‘An intentional object of action is something an agent can be said to have a preference 
for, a pull towards (however mild, calm, or stable) in virtue of desires he empirically 
has’ (Sherman, p. 65).
2.6.6 Decision and the Will
Although it is often suggested that Aristotle, like Plato, had no distinct notion of the
will, W.D. Ross sees Aristotle’s teaching on decision or rational choice as ‘clearly an
attempt to formulate such a conception’ (pp. 199-200). W.F.R. Hardie quotes Burnet’s
statement that decision or ‘prohairesis is really what we call the will’ (p. 163), although
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he acknowledges that he is unclear as to what either Ross or Burnet had in mind. 
Hardie goes on to state that he is even less clear as to what commentators such as 
Gauthier and Jolif meant when they claimed that Aristotle had no notion of will or of 
free will. Despite the fact that allowances have to be made on account of the difficulty 
of establishing what Aristotle meant when he used the word prohairesis, and that it 
might not be possible to do so precisely, Hardie himself, in the appended notes to the 
second edition o f his book, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, supports the view ‘that Aristotle, 
when he spoke of prohairesis, was sometimes referring to an activity of willing’ (p. 
380). Ross goes on to point out that some of the features of Aristotle’s teaching 
represent ‘a great advance on any previous thought on the subject’ (p. 200). Among 
these features, he includes the distinction of choice from appetite and rational wish, and 
the recognition of it as involving both desire and reason or thought -  and not simply 
desire in addition to reason, but desire guided by reason and reason impelled by desire. 
For Aristotle, decision or rational choice is the result of a deliberative process that both 
takes time and precedes action. Decision is the efficient cause of action, and, in this 
sense, it seems to involve something very like a notion of the will understood as a 
mental event that precedes and causes certain actions.
Terence Irwin suggests that there is at least an implicit notion of the will behind 
Aristotle’s ‘identifying virtue with a state that involves rational choice or decision [...], 
rather than with a tendency to act’.18 ‘Virtue, then, is a state that decides’ (1106b36). 
The focus is not so much on any external results that might be achieved. This is not to 
suggest that the virtuous person should not act on his decisions. On the contrary,
18 T .  H .  I r w in ,  ‘T h e  V i r tu e s :  T h e o r y  a n d  C o m m o n  S e n s e  in  G r e e k  P h i l o s o p h y ’ , in  H ow  S h ou ld  O ne L ive?  
e d .  b y  R o g e r  C r i s p  ( O x f o r d :  C l a r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 6 ) ,  p p .  3 7 - 5 5  (p .  5 4 ) .
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expressing a virtuous state in action is better than simply having the state. ‘But he does 
not take external success to be necessary for the virtue; he insists that virtuous agents 
retain their virtue even in adverse external circumstances (NE  1100b30-35)’ (Irwin, The 
Virtues: Theory and Common Sense, p. 54). Thus Aristotle allows for the fact that 
circumstances can intervene to frustrate the exercise of virtue. For example, a 
magnificent person might fail in his attempts to complete a certain project because of 
external conditions outside his control. But if  his failure were due to a lack of 
appropriate knowledge, this would indicate a lack of virtue.
2.6.7 Prudential Decision and the Commanding of Action
In general, making a good decision is not sufficient for virtue. Besides deliberating and 
deciding, prudence also involves commanding that the action decided upon actually be 
done. ‘Someone is not prudent simply by knowing; he must also act on his knowledge’ 
(1152a8-9). Knowledge and decision must lead to action if  the agent is to become truly 
virtuous and succeed in living a good life. If  prudence did not go beyond what the 
virtuous agent deliberated about and decided, it would fail as a practical virtue. The 
action decided upon might never be done. Prudence requires not only the making but 
also the carrying out of good decisions. ‘Prudence is prescriptive, since its end is what 
action we must or must not do, whereas comprehension only judges’ (1143a8-10). For 
Aristotle, a decision involving prudence is not the same as a moral judgment. A person 
might consider the morality of a practice such as capital punishment and make a moral 
judgment about it without ever having to make a prudential decision about the same 
matter. Prudence is always about something that the agent faces personally. He 
deliberates about and decides spmething that he will actually do or not do. His
prudential decision commands him to act or not to act.
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2.7 PR UD EN CE A N D  C O N TEM PLA TIO N
2.7.1 Theoretical Wisdom
Scientific knowledge (episteme) is the first intellectual virtue that Aristotle discusses in 
Book VI (1139b 18-34). It is a cognitive state of the soul, which, when activated, grasps 
a particular body of doctrine or instructions that can be demonstrated from more basic 
principles of nature. Strictly speaking, it is knowledge of scientific laws or syllogistic 
explanation of necessary and unchanging truths, and it includes mathematics and some 
disciplines that study the natural universe. Understanding (nous) (1140b31-1141 a8) is 
closely related to scientific knowledge. Sometimes called comprehension, intelligence, 
or intuition, it is the ability to grasp the ultimate premises or starting points on which 
scientific knowledge is based. Theoretical wisdom (sophia) is the combination of 
scientific knowledge and understanding concerning the highest objects; it is the best 
form of knowledge. ‘Wisdom is both scientific knowledge and understanding about the 
things that are by nature most honorable’ (1141 b3-4). Theoretical wisdom is to be 
distinguished from political science and from prudence, which are ‘about human 
concerns, about things open to deliberation’ (1141bl0). Scientific knowledge, 
understanding and theoretical wisdom concern the things about the universe that cannot 
be changed. The activity of theoretical wisdom is what Aristotle calls contemplative 
study (thedria); he has in mind the study of subjects such as metaphysics, mathematics 
and natural science. In his view, the activity of contemplating these subjects is the 
finest activity for a human being. It is the activity of the most divine element or part of 
a human being (1177b26-28).
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2.7.2 Distinguishing Theoretical Wisdom and Prudence
For Aristotle, the realms of theoretical wisdom and of practical wisdom or prudence are 
incommensurable. He characterizes the knowledge of a person such as Anaxagoras or 
Thales as ‘extraordinary, amazing, difficult, and divine, but useless, because it is not 
human goods that he looks for’ (1141b6-8). Such a person might be regarded as very 
knowledgeable, but not necessarily as prudent (1141b5). Theoretical wisdom has no 
immediate practical end; it is not utilitarian. It can also be suggested that it is not 
humanistic. Its objects are above the human, and the pursuit of them requires 
something more than the merely human (1177b26-28). According to Aristotle, ‘it 
would be absurd for someone to think that political science or prudence is the most 
excellent science; for the best thing in the universe is not a human being’ (1141a20-22). 
At a later stage, he states that ‘there are other beings of a far more divine nature than 
human beings -  most evidently, for instance, the beings composing the universe’ 
(1141a34-l 141b2). In these lines, Aristotle seems to be reflecting the traditional Greek 
belief not only in a pantheon of gods but also in a circle of superhuman beings. The 
stars and other heavenly bodies were thought to be emulating the activities of the gods 
by their eternal movement. According to the traditional view, some of the gods 
performed regular functions in which they presided over and ran ‘the various branches 
of nature and universal features of human life: the movement of the sun, the return of 
the seasons, weather, the sea, childbirth, agriculture and so on’ (Broadie, Ethics with 
Aristotle, p. 409). These were the necessary duties of the relevant deities. They also 
engaged in various extraordinary or extra-curricular activities. Homer portrays them as 
sometimes celebrating together, ‘intervening in the affairs of kings and cities, and 
jockeying with each other for control of historic events’ (ibid.).
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2.7.3 Looking Beyond the Human
In his ethical treatises, Aristotle does not try to describe the nature of the divine in the 
way that he does in some of his other works, most notably Metaphysics XII, 7-10, 
where he puts forward a very exalted conception of God. Nevertheless, he does make 
several references to the gods in the Nicomachean Ethics, and it is clear that his moral 
philosophy does have a definite religious dimension. He affirms that the gods have a 
role in human life. ‘For if the gods pay some attention to human beings, as they seem 
to, it would be reasonable for them to take pleasure in what is best and most akin to 
them, namely understanding’ (1179a25-26). Aristotle belonged to a culture whose gods 
were thought to be not all that removed from human beings -  except as regards our 
condition of mortality. In her book, Ethics with Aristotle, Broadie goes so far as to say 
that the Greek gods ‘were clearly not a species separate from the human species’ (p. 
409). She develops this point in a way that is very striking.
They do not differ from us in anything like the way in which we differ from ants 
[...]. There is not only parallel behaviour, but communication and family 
relationships and the tribal unity in which all turn towards Zeus as ‘father of gods 
and man’. Even less was the difference between gods and men the difference 
between finite and infinite. It was the difference between us as we are and as we 
should be if we were immortal, which is to imply: if we were not afflicted with 
aging and decline, disease, poverty, toil, frustration, anxiety and exposure to every 
kind o f pain and indignity, (ibid.)
By contrast, the gods were thought to live lives of ease and freedom. Their regular 
cosmic business and various other activities were never for them ‘like the bitter 
necessities which wear us out before we have a chance to realize more than a fraction of 
our human potential’ (ibid.).
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For Aristotle, ‘human beings are not the measure of all things but find their own true 
measure through contemplation of an eternal order beyond themselves’.19 He does not 
believe that we should look at our lives only from a human point of view. Like Plato, 
he looks to something beyond the human and sees in it something that is a guide to the 
living of a true human life. He differs from Plato in that ‘his divine standard is a 
particular thing -  a living god — not a form or universal’.20 Aristotle also believes that 
there is something less than the human. He thinks that we should resist the temptation 
to reduce ourselves to this level. Although our lives can be compared with those of 
other animals and plants, we are in reality far superior. If  we make use of what is 
distinctively human in us, our lives can be ‘an approximation of divine life. Excellence 
in reasoning, both practical and theoretical, occupies a central place in Aristotle’s ethics 
in part because it explains why we occupy this intermediate position in the cosmic 
hierarchy’ (Kraut, Human Good, p. 100). In comparison, a life dedicated to the pursuit 
of physical pleasure is subhuman. ‘The defender of such a life would have to admit that 
mere animals could live as well or better than human beings, and that a bodiless god 
would be miserable’ (ibid.). Thus Aristotle’s moral philosophy must be seen as an 
attempt ‘to organize human life into a systematic unity, and to locate human beings 
within a larger metaphysical framework. It goes well beyond a mere listing of goods as 
they present themselves to our community’ (ibid., p. 101).
19 J o s e p h  D u n n e ,  B ack  to  th e R ough G rou n d: 'Phronesis ’ a n d  'Techne ’ in M odern  P h ilosoph y a n d  in 
A ris to tle , ( N o t r e  D a m e ,  IN :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  N o t r e  D a m e  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 3 ) ,  p .  2 3 9 .
20 R i c h a r d  K r a u t ,  ‘A r i s to t l e  o n  t h e  H u m a n  G o o d :  A n  O v e r v i e w ’ , in  A r is to tle ’s E thics  ( s e e  N u s s b a u m  
[ 1 9 9 9 ]  a b o v e ) ,  p p .  7 9 - 1 0 4  ( p .  9 9 ) .
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2.7.4 Theoretical Wisdom -  An Indirect Practical Dimension
For Aristotle, the exercise of theoretical wisdom is the way of life that is most godlike. 
Although a life dedicated to the acquisition of theoretical wisdom does not have 
practical import directly, it can be argued that it does have practical import indirectly. 
Such a way of life requires great discipline and concentration, and it develops the 
character of the person who is truly committed to it. Thus it ‘has ethical substance at its 
core’ (Dunne, p. 239). Also, the person who engages properly in contemplative study is 
enabled ‘to acquire a disposition which allows the right order of the cosmos and the 
simplicity of the deity to work their way into his soul’ (ibid.).
2.7.5 The Elevation of Theoretical Wisdom and the Challenge to Prudence
Aristotle’s elevation of theoretical wisdom and the contemplative life poses serious
questions for prudence and the ethical or political life. In Chapter 8 of Book X,
Aristotle tells us very directly that the ethical life realizes eudaimonia only ‘in a
secondary way’ (1178a9). Perfect eudaimonia consists in the life of contemplative
study (1178a7). In Chapter 7, he urges us ‘as far as we can [...] [to] go to all lengths to
live a life in accord with our supreme element’ (1177b34-35), i.e., our theoretical
reason. Earlier in the same chapter, he tells us that ‘we deny ourselves leisure so that
we can be at leisure, and fight wars so that we can be at peace’ (1177b4-6). ‘Actions in
accord with the virtues [...] require trouble, aim at some [further] end, and are
choiceworthy for something other than themselves’ (1177bl 7-19). On the other hand,
the life of contemplative study is pure activity and pure leisure, and it ‘aims at no end
apart from itself (1177b21). ‘If (theoretical) understanding, more than anything else, is
the human being’ (1178a8), prudence and the ethical life seem to be relegated to a less
than premier position. In his notes, Irwin points out that the use of the phrase ‘more to
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be identified with the person’ (p. 310). The implication here is that the contemplative 
than anything else suggests a qualification to the claim that theoretical understanding is 
life is not the only constituent of eudaimonia. Also, the fact that Aristotle urges us to 
live the contemplative life only ‘as far as we can’ (1177b34) suggests that there are 
constraints on how it should be pursued: not as a god, perhaps, but as a human being, 
within limits set by prudence.
2.7.6 The Unity of the Highest Good
Richard Kraut makes a very strong case for the unity of the highest good in Aristotle’s 
moral philosophy. He highlights the fact that Aristotle does not treat virtuous activity 
as just one good among others. ‘He takes the good to consist in virtuous activity alone; 
it is the good, not just a good, because everything else is to be sought for its sake’ 
(Kraut, Human Good, p. 84). According to Kraut, Aristotle sees virtuous activity as a 
single type of good that can be equated with happiness or eudaimonia. He points out 
that Aristotle stresses the self-sufficiency o f eudaimonia already in Chapter 7 of Book 1 
(1097bl4-20); happiness is not to be seen as a composite of all intrinsic goods. Goods 
such as health, strength, honour, friends, etc., are subordinate to virtue. Although they 
help to sustain virtuous activity, they do not increase its value.
2.7.7 The Best Virtue: Perfect or Complete?
In defending the view that Aristotle puts forward in Book X, that the best life for a
human being is one that has contemplation as its ultimate end, Kraut reminds us of the
conclusion of the ergon argument in Chapter 7 of Book 1. ‘And so the human good
proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most
complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one’ (1098al6-18). In these lines, where
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Irwin has ‘best and most complete virtue’, Kraut has ‘best and most perfect virtue’. 
This is because he opposes the interpretation that ‘the best virtue is the composite of 
them all [...] I think Aristotle wrote these words in order to anticipate his conclusion 
that one virtue -  theoretical wisdom -  is best’ (Kraut, Human Good, p. 103, n. 16). 
Also, in the last few lines of Book VI (1145a6-ll), Aristotle ‘briefly remarks that 
theoretical wisdom is superior to practical wisdom, and that the latter issues orders for 
the sake o f the former’ (ibid., p. 88). It is significant that when Aristotle takes up these 
issues again in Chapters 7 and 8 o f Book X, his first sentence recalls the ergon 
argument of Book 1. ‘If happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for 
it to accord with the supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing’ 
(1177al2-13). Although Kraut emphasizes that eudaimonia is only perfectly realized 
when one exercises the highest virtue, i.e., theoretical wisdom, he goes on to point out 
that the contemplative and the practically wise agent or good politician have much in 
common. The successful living of the ethical or political life requires and expresses 
high levels o f intellectual virtue. The political leader has to reflect about the ends of 
human life; he needs good judgment when hard decisions have to be taken; his reason is 
in control of his emotions, and they in turn are properly integrated with his reason. 
‘Happiness consists in just one thing -  virtuous activity of the rational soul -  although 
this one type of good can be further analyzed into two species, and one of them is even 
more worthwhile than the other’ (Kraut, Human Good, p. 90).
2.7.8 The Best -  Not the Enemy of the Good
One of the attractions of Kraut’s interpretation is that it enables the Nicomachean Ethics
to be seen as better organized and more unified than is often thought. He suggests that
Aristotle viewed Book VI as providing an instrument for more exact decision making
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because he understood the exercising o f the two most important virtues of thought 
described in Book VI, i.e., practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom, to be the ultimate 
goals of fulfilled and successful living. Book VI gives us a clearer picture of the 
ultimate goal of life in that it establishes that both the contemplative or philosophical 
life and the ethical or political life are focused on the exercise of intellectual virtues. 
‘The purpose o f Book VI is not to decide between these two ultimate ends -  that 
question is postponed to Book X -  but to provide a better understanding of what the two 
ultimate ends are’ (Kraut, Human Good, p. 92), and what commitment to them entails. 
To live the philosophical life properly, as well as needing to know what theoretical 
wisdom is, the agent also needs to be able to answer certain quantitative questions. In 
terms of external resources, for example, what and how much might he need? The ideal 
ethical or political agent faces similar questions. He needs to be able to determine how 
much money he might need for his household and for his various political and social 
projects. Also, he has to be able to find the mean in several other dimensions of his life, 
his relationship to his own emotions and friends being but two examples. His anger and 
other passions need to be neither too strong nor too weak, but appropriate to each 
occasion. He needs to have neither too few nor too many friends. And when, in Book 
X, Aristotle does decide in favour of the philosophical life, there is no suggestion that 
the best — contemplation -  should be seen as the enemy of the good -  prudence or 
practical wisdom. ‘He gives no hint that we should act unethically in order to maximize 
contemplation’ (Kraut, Human Good, p. 94). Although Aristotle is clear that 
contemplation is the ultimate end, and that the best we can do for ourselves or other 
people is to promote this end, he accepts that ‘there are many people who are incapable 
of achieving this good, and so when one acts for their sake, one ought to promote their 
ability to engage in ethical activity’ (ibid., pp. 95-96).
2.8 PR U D EN C E A N D  PER C EPTIO N
2.8.1 Universals and Particulars
An understanding of ultimate ends is only part of what the agent needs so as to be able 
to live well. In addition to knowledge of universals, good deliberation also requires an 
awareness of particulars. Aristotle’s prudent person is good at making decisions partly 
because he is able to perceive the salient features of any situation. The capacity to be 
sensitive to the relevant details in particular situations involves both knowing what to 
look for and being able to ‘think through highly general questions about the ultimate 
end of human life’ (Kraut, Human Good, p. 98). Indeed, in Chapter 7 of Book VI, 
Aristotle seems to emphasize the particulars more than the universals. ‘And since 
prudence is concerned with action, it must possess both [the universal and the particular 
knowledge] or the [particular] more [than the universal]’ (1141b22-23). In the same 
section, he remarks that ‘some people who lack knowledge but have experience are 
better in action than others who have knowledge’ (1141 bl 7-18). In practice, the person 
with experience of particulars often makes better decisions than the person with 
superior theoretical knowledge. For example, the person ‘who knows that bird meats 
are light and healthy will be better at producing health’ than ‘someone who knows that 
light meats are digestible and [hence] healthy, but not which sorts of meats are light’ 
(1141M9-22). W. D. Ross comments on these lines in terms of the practical syllogism. 
‘Practical wisdom being concerned with particular actions, it is better to know the 
conclusion of the practical syllogism without the major premise than the major premise 
without the conclusion’ (p. 219). Although commentators often use the term, practical 
syllogism, Aristotle himself does not use it. When Aristotle does refer to ‘inferences 
about actions’ (1144a31), Irwin points out in his notes that ‘he cannot have in mind a
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syllogism in the full technical sense (since sullogismos [inference] about action, unlike 
a strict syllogism, has a particular premise)’ (p. 335).
2.8.2 Two Kinds of Particulars
In his notes, Irwin makes a distinction between particulars as relatively determinate 
types, for example, bird meat as distinct from light meat, and particulars as specific 
instances, for example, this piece o f  chicken or any individual item (p. 245). Where 
particulars are determinate types, identification of them is part of good deliberation. 
Where they are specific instances, ‘they are not themselves discovered by deliberation, 
but perception o f them is required for successful deliberation, so that good deliberation 
must include good perception’ (ibid.). To return to Aristotle’s example, the closer one 
comes to knowledge o f which particular things produce health, the better. To know that 
bird meats are easily digested is better than to know that light meats are easily digested. 
Indeed, to know that light meats are easily digested is not strictly necessary. However, 
to know that this piece of chicken is easily digested is best of all since by acting on that 
knowledge, the agent is most likely to eat healthily. Thus prudence is more the 
knowledge of particulars that perception makes possible than it is knowledge of 
universals. On account of the fact that ‘perception controls [particulars]’ (1147a26), 
prudence must include a kind of perception.
2.8.3 A Special Kind of Perception
The kind o f perception Aristotle has in mind ‘is not the perception of special objects,
but the sort by which we perceive that the last among mathematical objects is a triangle’
(1142a27-29). This kind of perception is not ordinary perception. For example, it is not
like the perception of colours, which are the proper objects of the sense of sight. It is
56
more like a mathematician trying to solve a problem. The problem might be the 
construction of a complex figure based on triangles. He needs both knowledge of 
universals -  the kind of triangle to be drawn to construct the figure -  and perception of 
particulars -  the particular triangle he is drawing to be of the required type. In a similar 
way, the prudent person is trying to solve a problem -  how to achieve eudaimonia in a 
particular situation. Solving the problem involves finding the right universals and 
bringing them together with a particular in the right way.
2.8.4 Perception and Deliberation
Perception comes into its own when deliberation has completed its work. ‘Nor do we 
deliberate about particulars, about whether this is a loaf, for instance, or is cooked the 
right amount; for these are questions for perception, and if we keep on deliberating at 
each stage we shall go on without end’ (1112b34-111 3a2). Deliberation identifies a 
universal of the right kind for perception to use. The agent can come to know by the 
sound it makes when he knocks on it whether a loaf is cooked properly. Perception 
uses such universals to guide action in accordance with the kind of wish that gets it 
started.
Perception is involved in another way also. Before the agent begins to deliberate at all, 
he has to have a practical problem to deliberate about. Sometimes it is his appetites 
(epithumiai) that initiate the deliberative process. He is hungry; he desires to eat; he 
wishes for the good. He begins to deliberate about what to eat: light meats are good; 
bird meats are light; he perceives that this piece of chicken is available and edible. If he 
is unhindered, he eats it.
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2.8.5 Perception, The Emotions and Prudence
Often, however, it is not the agent’s appetites that get deliberation started but the
situation in which he finds himself. The way in which a particular situation brings itself
to his attention is often through his emotions or feelings. His anger or fear or sympathy
is aroused, and these emotions lead him to deliberate. Indeed, these same emotions
contribute to the perception and interpretation o f the very situations to which they are
responses. It is partly because we can feel anger or fear that we perceive situations as
insults or as threats. Thus our emotions tire modes of perception. In her book, The
Therapy o f  Desire, Martha Nussbaum states that ‘emotions have a rich cognitive
structure. It is clear that they are not mindless surges o f affect, but discerning ways of
• 21viewing objects; and beliefs of various kinds are their necessary conditions’. 
Nussbaum goes on to discuss the two painful emotions -  fear and pity. It is striking that 
Aristotle does not try to individuate such emotions by referring to various kinds of 
painful feelings.
Emotions, instead, are individuated by reference to their characteristic beliefs. 
We cannot describe the pain that is peculiar to fear, or say how fear differs from 
grief or pity, without saying that it is pain at the thought o f  a certain sort o f future 
event that is believed to be impending. But if the beliefs are an essential part of 
the definition of the emotion, then we have to say that their role is not merely that 
o f external necessary condition. They must be seen as constituent parts of the 
emotion itself. (Nussbaum, Therapy o f  Desire, p. 88)
21 M a r th a  C . N u s s b a u m ,  The T herapy o f  D esire ,  ( P r i n c e t o n ,  N J :  P r in c e to n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 4 ) ,  p .  8 8 .
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In the following paragraph, Nussbaum points out that Aristotle uses two Greek 
prepositions, ek and epi, to highlight the intimate relationship between belief and 
feeling.
There is both a causal relationship (fear is pain and disturbance ‘out o f  -  e k -  the 
thought of impending evils), and also a relationship of intentionality or aboutness 
(pity is defined as ‘painful feeling directed at -  epi — the appearance that someone 
is suffering In fact, both relationships are present in both cases, clearly:
for it is equally true that pity’s pain is produced by the thought of another’s 
suffering -  Aristotle’s rhetorical analysis relies on this -  and also that fear is pain 
directed at the imagined future evil, (ibid.)
Thus Aristotle understands emotions as not only involving sensations and desires but 
also beliefs. Through them, we are enabled to see situations as problematic and as 
requiring deliberation and action.
In Aristotle’s view, human emotions have to be educated and brought into harmony
with a correct view of the human good. But when they are educated properly, it is not
just that they play a crucial role in motivating the agent to act virtuously, they are also
‘recognitions of truth and value. And as such they are not just instruments of virtue,
they are constituent parts of virtuous agency’ (Nussbaum, Therapy o f  Desire, p. 96). As
we have already seen, Aristotle understands prudence and the virtues of character as
mutually interdependent. And he defines the virtues of character as states or
dispositions regarding emotions or feelings. ‘By virtue I mean virtue of character; for
this is about feelings and actions, and these admit of excess, deficiency, and an
intermediate condition’ (1106M7-19). Aristotle goes on to state that ‘having these
feelings at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right
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end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to 
virtue’ (1106b21-23). In the next line, Aristotle points out that ‘similarly, actions also 
admit of excess, deficiency, and an intermediate condition’ (1106b24). With a passage 
such as this in mind, Nussbaum makes a very apt comment.
What this means is that even were the apparently correct action to be chosen 
without the appropriate motivating and reactive emotions, it would not count for 
Aristotle as a virtuous action: an action is virtuous only if  it is done in the way 
that a virtuous person would do it. All o f this is a part of the equipment of the 
person of practical wisdom, part of what practical rationality is. Rationality 
recognizes truth; the recognition of some ethical truths is impossible without 
emotion; indeed, certain emotions centrally involve such recognitions. 
(Nussbaum, Therapy o f  Desire, p. 96)
Thus the person who is truly prudent will have emotions that correctly perceive and 
interpret a situation and that are appropriately responsive to it.
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3.1 H IST O R IC A L BA C K G R O U N D
3.1.1 The Reception of Aristotle in Thirteenth Century Western Europe
The reception of the complete works of Aristotle in Latin translations was a 
development that contributed very significantly to the shaping of thirteenth-century 
western European thought. In the early Middle Ages, only Aristotle’s logical works 
were translated. In the sixth century, Boethius translated and wrote commentaries on 
the Categories and the De Interpretatione. He also translated and wrote a commentary 
on Porphyry’s Isagoge. These works formed the logica vetus and came to be 
recognized as the standard texts in logic. From the middle of the twelfth century, many 
of Aristotle’s other writings began to become available in translation. Up to that time, 
medieval thought had been dominated by such figures as Augustine, Boethius, and 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, all of whom were strongly influenced by Neo- 
Platonism. With the increasing availability of most of the works of Aristotle, the 
medieval world was challenged by quite a different philosophical outlook, one in which 
human beings and other things in the natural world were understood not on the basis of 
their participation in an ideal world o f forms but in terms of their own inner principles 
or natures.
The study of Aristotelian philosophy developed through the Faculties o f Arts o f the 
universities. In 1239, when Thomas Aquinas went to the University of Naples to study 
the liberal arts and philosophy, Aristotle’s natural philosophy was among the subjects 
being taught there. It was here that Aquinas spent the next five years of his life and 
‘had as one of his teachers [...] a certain Master Peter of Ireland’.1 It was also here that
1 M a gistr i P e tr i de Ybernia: E xp ositio  e t Q u aestion es in A ris to te lis  L ibrum  d e  L ongitudine et B revita te  
Vitae, e d .  b y  M i c h a e l  D u n n e  ( L o u v a i n - P a r i s :  E d i t io n s  P e e t e r s ,  1 9 9 3 ) ,  p .  1.
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he became acquainted with the Dominicans and took the decision to enter the Order, 
receiving the habit in early 1244. At that time, Naples was part of the kingdom of 
Sicily. As a result of the translations Michael Scot and others had made from Arabic 
and Greek works, ‘Sicily and southern Italy experienced an intense cultural life at the 
time. Aristotelian science, Arabic astronomy, and Greek medicine all were flourishing 
in Palermo, Salerno, and Naples’.2 King Frederick II of Sicily employed Michael Scot 
from about 1227. Scot’s greatest achievement was probably his translation of many of 
the Arabic commentaries of Averroes. He died in Palermo about 1235. In other places, 
there was considerable opposition to these new developments. The study of Aristotle 
was only finally and officially approved at the University of Paris between 1252 and 
1255. At this point, Thomas Aquinas was completing his theological training as a 
Dominican there. What was a steady stream in the first half of the thirteenth century 
became a flood from the middle of that century onwards.
At this stage the reception of Aristotle was part of a vast effort to absorb the 
philosophical, medical, astrological, and natural science not only of ancient 
Greece, but also of past and contemporary Judaism and Islam. The Aristotelian 
encyclopaedia provided the framework for all this new material.3 
Very quickly, Aristotle came to be known as the Philosopher, and scholastic theoretical 
discussions o f all kinds were based on his conceptual framework.
2 J e a n - P ie r r e  T o r r e l l ,  O .P . ,  S a in t Thom as A quinas: Volume 1 - The P erso n  an d  H is W ork , t r a n s .  b y  R o b e r t  
R o y a l ,  2  v o ls  ( W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . :  T h e  C a th o l ic  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  A m e r ic a  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 6 ) ,  p .  6 .
3 C .  H .  L o h r ,  ‘T h e  M e d ie v a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  A r i s t o t l e ’, in  The C am brid ge  H isto ry  o f  L a ter  M ed ieva l 
P h ilosoph y , e d .  b y  N o r m a n  K r e tz m a n n ,  A n t h o n y  K e n n y  a n d  J a n  P i n b o r g  ( C a m b r i d g e :  C a m b r i d g e  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 2 ) ,  p p .  8 0 - 9 8  ( p .  8 1 ) .
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3.1.2 Aquinas Seeking Truth by Studying Aristotle
That Thomas Aquinas devoted immense energy to the study o f Aristotle’s works is 
beyond question. This is the more remarkable because such work never formed part of 
his normal academic duties. He was never a master of the Faculty of Arts in any of the 
universities in which he taught. Yet he clearly saw in Aristotle a wonderful intellectual 
challenge and resource, and he considered it to be of the utmost importance to try to 
penetrate his thought as completely as he could. In all, Aquinas wrote twelve 
commentaries on the works of Aristotle. When he died in 1274, some of them were left 
uncompleted. He commented on De Interpretatione, the Posterior Analytics, the 
Physics, De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, Meteora, De Anima, De Sensu et 
Sensato, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, the Metaphysics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and 
the Politics. In all o f these works, Aquinas wrote more as a philosopher than as a 
historian. ‘His intention is always to seek the truth of what the Philosopher has 
thought’.4
For Aquinas, Aristotle is always the principal philosophical source. He regards 
Aristotle as an expert on human nature and takes from him the basic structure of his 
ethics: the ordering to happiness as the final human end, the organization of the moral 
virtues, and the analysis of friendship that he employs in treating of charity. In the 
Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologiae, one of the major systematic accounts o f his 
moral science, ‘Aquinas makes a massive number of specific references to Aristotle 
himself: the Index Thomisticus lists 38 references to “Aristoteles” and 977 references to
4 J a n  A .  A e r s te n ,  ‘A q u i n a s ’ s P h i l o s o p h y  in  i t s  H i s t o r i c a l  S e t t i n g ’, in  The C am bridge C om panion  to 
A qu in as, e d .  b y  N o r m a n  K r e tz m a n n  a n d  E le o n o r e  S tu m p  ( C a m b r i d g e :  C a m b r i d g e  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  
1 9 9 3 ) ,  p p .  1 2 -3 7  ( p .  2 1 ) .
64
“Philosophies”’. 5 Only Scripture and Augustine are referred to more often. Aquinas 
was firmly convinced that philosophers could attain truth, and this conviction led him to 
look for and to promote harmony between Aristotle and Christian faith. Although he 
understood well the difference between revelation and reason, theology and philosophy, 
he did not separate them -  as was done later.
3.1.3 The Nicomachean Ethics -  Some Medieval Latin Translations and 
Commentaries
The first Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics was made anonymously in the 
twelfth century. Consisting only of Books II and III, it was known as the Ethica vetus. 
The entire Nicomachean Ethics was translated anonymously early in the thirteenth 
century. However, only Book I of this translation, known as the Ethica nova, was 
widely circulated. Some Latin commentaries, based on one or other of these 
translations or on a combination of the two, were also produced during this period. 
They had in common an approach to the human end as discussed by Aristotle that was 
‘understood as the happiness achieved through union with God or with a reality caused 
by God’.6
After 1240, a number o f new commentaries began to appear. Their most important 
characteristic was an understanding of the properly human end discussed in Book 1 of 
the Nicomachean Ethics ‘as the happiness attainable in this life through the activity of 
the moral virtues’ (Doig, p. 1). In 1240, Herman the German produced a translation
5 D e n is  J .  M .  B r a d l e y ,  A qu in as on th e T w ofo ld  H um an G o od , ( W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . :  T h e  C a th o l ic  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  A m e r i c a  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 7 ) ,  p .  1 0 3 .
6 J a m e s  C .  D o ig ,  A q u in a s ’s  P h ilo so p h ica l C om m en tary on the ‘E th ic s ’: A H is to r ica l P ersp ective , 
( D o r d r e c h t ,  T h e  N e th e r l a n d s :  K l u w e r  A c a d e m ic  P u b l i s h e r s ,  2 0 0 1 ) ,  p .  1.
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from the Arabic of both the Nicomachean Ethics and Averroes’s commentary on that 
work. The commentary of Averroes was significant in that it was a first indication that 
a theological perspective was not ‘a prerequisite for finding that Aristotle discusses a 
happiness that has its limitations, i.e., a “beatitudo imperfecta’” (Doig, p. 15). At 
around the same time, Robert Kilwardby, a Dominican and master o f the Faculty of 
Arts in Paris between 1237 and 1245, also wrote a commentary that avoided some of 
the misconceptions o f the earlier Latin commentaries. He viewed happiness as a human 
good that could be achieved by the agent’s habitual actions.
Working from the Greek text and making use of previous translations, Robert 
Grosseteste translated the entire Nicomachean Ethics during 1246 and 1247. Known as 
the Liber ethicorum, this work became immensely popular. Like all the medieval 
commentators, Grosseteste’s method o f translating was literal rather than literary. He 
was even more literal than his predecessors and particularly thorough as well. Fie 
included numerous annotations or notulae explaining Greek terms and points of 
grammar. Also, Grosseteste translated several Greek commentaries, the most important 
of which was probably that by Eustratius of Nicea, who lived in the late eleventh 
century. As regards Aristotle’s statement in Book X about happiness or the human 
good being activity in accord ‘with the best and most complete virtue’ (1098al7), 
Eustratius thought prudence was the virtue Aristotle had in mind at this point. 
According to Doig, the underlying assumption here was ‘a view of the life guided by 
moral virtues as the most properly human and as the life directed toward the end 
“perfect and of itself sufficient” that is studied in Ethics A ’ (Doig, pp. 16-17).
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3.1.4 Albert the Great and Some Aspects of his Super Ethica
Albert the Great, a Dominican teacher o f Thomas Aquinas possibly in Paris between 
1246 and 1248 and certainly in Cologne from the autumn of 1248, was one of the 
greatest living authorities at this time. He became aware of Grosseteste’s translations of 
the Nicomachean Ethics and the Greek Commentaries and used them as the basis for a 
series o f lectures, which he gave in Cologne between 1248 and 1252. These lectures 
were published as the Super Ethica and were probably based to some extent on a record 
or reportatio that Aquinas -  as one of Albert’s students -  had drawn up. Albert’s 
enthusiasm for Grosseteste’s work is clear from the fact that he refers to it nearly 300 
times, using such terms as ‘the Commentator says’ or ‘according to the Commentator’. 
Albert follows the interpretations of the Greek commentators as regards the discussion 
of happiness at the centre of Book 1. He sees it ‘as the study of civil happiness to be 
obtained through activity in accord with moral virtue’ (Doig, p. 18). He views the 
agent’s proper work as ‘the governing of his life by practical reason, his best and most 
proper potency’ (ibid., p. 20). Although civil happiness can dispose the agent to 
contemplative happiness, ‘the happiness natural to man is that coming from life in 
society’ (ibid.).
Albert understands prudence as the most important virtue at the source of civil 
happiness. He sees its main activity not as deliberation, but rather as the act of choosing 
the end. Prudence determines an end such as that of making a journey to Rome. Also, 
prudence gives the moral virtues their proper direction as regards their end. According 
to Doig, Albert argues that the ‘nature-like tendency of a moral virtue toward an end is 
possible only if  the end has been prescribed for it by something joined to it, and this is
accomplished by prudence perfecting the order given by natural reason’ (p. 22).
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In the context of Book X’s discussion of happiness, Albert notes an ‘objection 
according to which the human intellect is not prepared for contemplation; compared to 
the entities above it, the human intellect is like the eye o f a bat in relation to the light of 
the sun’ (ibid., p. 23). He goes on to make a distinction between philosophical and 
divine contemplation. ‘While “theophanies descending from God” are required for the 
latter, by the habitus o f wisdom the human intellect is prepared for philosophical 
contemplation’ (ibid.). However, he sees even philosophical contemplation ‘as quite 
other than the properly ratiocinative cognition involved in the greater part of the soul’s 
activities’ (ibid., pp. 23-24).
3.2 AQUINAS, ALBERT THE GREAT AND PRUDENCE
3.2.1 Aquinas on the Question of Happiness in Aristotle -  A Different Perspective
Doig suggests that ‘Aristotle’s Ethics was never far from Aquinas’s mind during the 
period extending from his first arrival in Paris in 1246 until his final departure from the 
city in 1272’ (ibid., p. 24). In his Commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, which he 
wrote between 1254 and 1256, there are more than 300 direct references to the 
Nicomachean Ethics. The Summa contra Gentiles (1262-1264) has 54 direct references 
and the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae (1265-1266) 71. One of the most striking 
things about Aquinas’s writings during this period is not only the frequency with which 
he makes references to the Nicomachean Ethics but also the fact that he repeatedly takes 
up positions as regards the intentio Aristotelis that are at variance with those of his 
teachers, including Albert. Doig, for example, points to passages in the Summa contra 
Gentiles (111.44), the Q.D. de Anima (a. 16) and the Prima Pars (88.1) where it is clear 
that Aquinas understood Aristotle’s teaching in Book X to be that theoretical ‘wisdom
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is the perfect virtue whose activity is at the source of the agent’s ultimate happiness’ 
(Doig, p. 26). Doig goes on to propose that such differences — as well as his 
appreciation of the importance of the Nicomachean Ethics -  suggest ‘at least one reason 
for Aquinas’s decision to present his own full-fledged interpretation of Aristotle’s 
Ethics, namely, to present Aristotle’s response to the question of human happiness’ 
(ibid.). When Aquinas comes to deal with the issue o f human happiness in his Sententia 
lihri Ethicorum (usually abbreviated SLE) or Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean 
Ethics', which he composed in Paris in the years 1271 and 1272, he makes it very clear 
that he regards Aristotle’s true position as being quite different to that put forward by 
such commentators as Albert and Averroes. He proposes that ‘happiness will more 
properly be found in the life of thought than in a life of activity, and in an act of reason 
or intellect than in an act of the appetitive power controlled by reason’.7
3.2.2 Differences between Aquinas and Albert as regards Prudence
When Aquinas’s SLE and Albert’s Super Ethica are compared from the point of view of 
their treatment of Aristotle’s understanding of prudence, significant differences also 
emerge. As we have already seen, Aristotle remarks in Chapter 13 o f Book VI that 
virtue or the state in accord with prudence is not merely ‘the state in accord with the 
correct reason, but the state involving the correct reason’ (1144b26-27). In his 
interpretation of these lines, Aquinas writes in terms that are very similar to those of the 
contemporary commentator, Sarah Broadie, discussed in Chapter 2.
7 S t. T h o m a s  A q u in a s ,  C om m en tary  on A r is to t le ’s  ‘N icom ach ean  E th ics  ’, t r a n s .  b y  C .  I .  L i t z in g e r ,  O .P . ,  
r e v .  e d n  ( N o t r e  D a m e ,  IN :  D u m b  O x  B o o k s ,  1 9 9 3 ) ,  1 .1 0 .S 1 2 6 ,  p .  4 2 .  T h i s  w o r k  i s  u s u a l ly  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  
SLE, i .e .,  S en ten tia  lib r iE th ico ru m . S L E . 1 .1 0 .S I 2 6  r e f e r s  t o  B o o k  1, L e c tu r e  1 0 , a n d  t o  p a r a g r a p h  1 2 6  o f  
t h e  S p ia z z i  e d i t io n .  F u r t h e r  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  D u m b  O x  B o o k s  e d i t io n  o f  A q u i n a s ’s C om m entary on 
A ris to tle 's  ‘N icom ach ean  E th ics ’ a r e  g iv e n  a f t e r  q u o ta t i o n s  in  th e  t e x t  f o l lo w in g  t h i s  s y s t e m .
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Not only does it pertain to moral virtue to be in accord with right reason -  
otherwise someone could be morally virtuous without the need o f prudence 
simply by the fact that he had been instructed by another’s mind -  but we must 
add that moral virtue is a habit accompanied by right reason, which of course is 
prudence. (S L E .Y U \.S\2S4)
At this point, Aquinas seems to understand Aristotle as simply expressing the essential 
co-existence of prudence and the virtues of character. Albert’s understanding is quite 
different. He relates ‘the state in accord with the correct reason’ to the basic role of 
prudence in the development of moral virtue. Reason is perfected for this purpose by 
prudence. Albert distinguishes between a form of prudence that is perfect and a form of 
prudence that is imperfect. He sees perfect prudence as being inseparable from moral 
virtue. However, an agent whose prudence is imperfect might be virtuous in the context 
of a situation requiring temperance but lacking in virtue in regard to a situation 
requiring courage. According to Albert, virtues are first possessed in seminal form. 
When an agent lacking the form of justice first acts justly, his action ‘arises from a 
seminal potency of justice, not from the complete and distinct habitus’ (Doig, p. 53). 
Behind his choice to perform the just action, there is rational activity resulting from the 
seed of prudence in his reason. As the agent gradually develops the habitus or state of 
justice, the imperfect prudence corresponding to this virtue is also gradually developed. 
The agent’s prudence can oniy be said to be perfect when all the moral virtues have 
been fully acquired. Albert comments on ‘the state involving the correct reason’ in the 
context o f the threefold function of prudence in relation to virtuous activity -  the 
predetermining of the end, the prescribing o f the choice, and the ordering or directing of 
activity towards the end. Doig suggests that Aquinas’s omission o f any discussion of
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these issues in his SLE can be interpreted as masking ‘a definite turning away from 
Albert’s doctrine’ (p. 49).
3.2.3 Prudence in Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences
In his writings on the interrelations of prudence and moral virtue, Doig detects a gradual 
distancing from Albert on the part of Aquinas. Even in his Commentary on Peter 
Lombard’s Sentences, which he wrote only a few years after he had been Albert’s 
student, there is evidence of a turning away. Already, Aquinas understands the end of 
human life as consisting in the good of reason. Nevertheless, the moral virtues have a 
crucial role to play in that they enable the agent to control his passions and actions so 
that reason’s grasp of the correct good can be fulfilled. Aquinas understands natural 
reason’s predetermining of the end of human life as preceding ‘prudence, just as the 
intellectus of principles [precedes] science’ (Doig, p. 55). He seems to regard reason as 
having a pre-eminent role in constituting virtue -  and not as Albert might have put it, 
reason having been perfected for this purpose by prudence. In Aquinas’s 
understanding, ‘reason naturally knows that the agent is to live according to what reason 
discovers to be good, and that such a life, when spelled out, will be found to encompass 
living temperately, courageously, and justly’ (Doig, p. 56). However, Aquinas does 
recognize prudence as predetermining the end in a secondary sense. It can be said to 
predetermine the end for moral virtues. For example, this might involve the prescribing 
of a particular act as courageous. ‘Given natural reason’s determination o f the end, that 
is, once the orientation of the moral virtues is established, prudence effects the mean in 
actions and passions’ (Doig, p. 55).
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However, Doig also points out that there are passages in the Commentary on the 
Sentences where Aquinas writes in a way that more closely resembles Albert. When 
considering ‘whether the other cardinal virtues are reduced to prudence as to the more 
principal virtue or cause’, Aquinas states that prudence is ‘the generator and both the 
custodian and the moderator o f virtues’ (p. 56). At this point, he understands correct 
reason or prudence as the cause o f the acquisition of the moral virtues ‘insofar as it is at 
the source of the actions bringing about their development’ (ibid.). Prudence is the 
custodian and moderator of the moral virtues ‘insofar as it determines the correct “path” 
o f each virtue by deliberation and choice’ (ibid., pp. 56-57). In this article, Aquinas is 
not as clear or as precise as he was earlier when he made a distinction between two 
senses o f predetermining the end. Indeed, Doig characterizes his presentation at this 
point ‘as indicative of a mind in the early stages o f grappling with a problem’ (ibid., p.
56).
3.2.4 Prudence in the De Veritate
It is in his De Veritate, written between 1256 and 1259, that Aquinas next treats of 
prudence. The context is a discussion on providence. God’s providential care can be 
spoken of ‘only by analogy with the agent’s providence regarding himself (Doig, p.
57). Referring to Aristotle at 1144b28, Aquinas states that ‘prudence is the reasoned 
plan o f doing things’.8 He goes on to make a distinction between prudence and art or 
craft. Art has to do with things to be made. Although it starts from an agent, it 
terminates in something extrinsic such as a bench or a house. The reasoned plan of 
making such things is what is called art. Prudence has to do with things to be done.
8 S t. T h o m a s  A q u in a s ,  Truth  (Q u aestion es d ispu ta ta e  d e  verita te ),  I r a n s .  b y  R o b e r t  W . M u l l ig a n ,  S .J .,  
( I n d ia n a p o l i s / C a m b r i d g e :  H a c k e t t  P u b l i s h i n g  C o m p a n y ,  I n c . ,  1 9 9 4 ) ,  Q u e s t i o n  5 ,  A r t ic le  1, p .  2 0 2 .
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These are ‘actions which do not go outside the agent, but, instead, are acts that perfect
him, as, for example, chaste living, bearing oneself patiently, and the like. The
reasoned plan of performing these is called prudence’ (Aquinas, Truth, p.202). Aquinas
then distinguishes between the end and the means. He states that ‘it is especially the
role of prudence to direct the means to the end’ (ibid., p. 203). Following Aristotle at
1142b31-33, 1140a25 and 1141b9, he reminds his readers that the prudent person is one
who deliberates well, and following Aristotle at 1112b 13, he states that ‘deliberation “is
not concerned with ends, but only with means’” (ibid.). Aquinas goes on to consider
the two ways in which the end of human activity pre-exists in us. The first way is
through the natural knowledge we have of our end. Following Aristotle at 1141b 10, he
states that this knowledge ‘belongs to the intellect, which is a principle of things to be
done as well as of things to be studied’ (ibid). The second way in which the end of
human activity pre-exists in us is through our desires. ‘Here the ends of things to be
done exist in us in our moral virtues, which influence a man to live a just, brave, or
temperate life. This is, in a sense, the proximate end o f things to be done’ (ibid.).
Continuing, Aquinas states that we are perfected in a similar way as regards the means
towards the end. ‘Our knowledge is perfected by counsel, our appetite, by choice; and
in these matters we are directed by prudence’ (ibid.). Aquinas goes on to consider
briefly the kind of reasoning process involved in prudence. The prudent person ‘must
stand in the proper relation to the ends themselves, for a reasoned plan cannot exist
unless the principles of reason are maintained’ (ibid.). He sums up by stating that
‘prudence requires not only the understanding of ends but also moral virtues by which
the will is settled in a correct end’ (ibid.). Following Aristotle at 1144a30-35 and
1144b30, Aquinas is very clear that a prudent person must be virtuous. Also, because a
superior power includes everything found in an inferior power, prudence in some way
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includes ‘both the will as directed towards the end and the knowledge of the end itself 
(ibid.). Doig regards Aquinas’s presentation of the role of prudence in the De Veritate 
as being for the most part clearer and more developed than that given in the 
Commentary on the Sentences. However, he regards his terminology as less satisfactory 
at this point than ‘it will be later when, in the SLE, he will explain that, for prudence to 
order effectively a choice, prudence is necessarily accompanied by the correct 
orientation of the human appetite’ (Doig, p. 59).
3.2.5 Prudence and Appointing the End for Moral Virtues in the Summa
Theologiae
Doig expresses himself surprised that when Aquinas comes to write the Prima 
Secundae about 13 years after he had written the De Veritate, he states that ‘prudence 
directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the 
end’.9 Following Aristotle at 1107al and 1144b21, he goes on to explain that ‘the end 
of each moral virtue is to keep the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; and this is 
appointed according to the right decision of prudence’ (ibid.). Although it is obviously 
the secondary meaning of appointing or predetermining the end that was assigned to 
prudence in the Commentary on the Sentences that Aquinas has in mind here, i.e., the 
prescription of a particular act as courageous or as temperate or whatever, Doig sees 
this as a return to Albert’s way of speaking. He goes on to suggest that it is as if  to 
anticipate the confusion that might arise for a reader trying to understand Aquinas’s
9 S t. T h o m a s  A q u in a s ,  S um m a T h eo lo g ia e , B l a c k f r ia r s  E n g l i s h  a n d  L a t in  e d i t io n ,  61 v o ls ,  v o l .  2 3  ( l a 2 a e ,  
q q .  4 7 - 5 6 ) ,  e d .  b y  W . D . H u g h e s ,  O .P . ,  ( L o n d o n / N e w  Y o r k :  E y r e  &  S p o t t i s w o o d e /M c G r a w - H i l l ,  1 9 6 9 ) ,  
l a 2 a e ,  Q u e s t i o n  6 6 ,  A r t i c l e  3 ,  a d .  3 .  F u r th e r  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h i s  e d i t i o n  o f  t h e  Sum m a T heologiae  a r e  g iv e n  
a f t e r  q u o ta t i o n s  in  t h e  t e x t  f o l l o w i n g  t h i s  s y s t e m  a n d  o m i t t i n g  t h e  t i t l e .
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meaning in assigning to prudence a function of predetermining the end, that John A. 
Oesterle, in his translation of this text, offers the following explanatory note.
Prudence does not prescribe the end of the moral virtues substantially and in 
general, for this is accomplished by what is called synderesis, the virtue by which 
we grasp the primary practical principles [...] Prudence directs the moral virtues 
in prescribing the end in regard to the manner of attaining the end and taking into 
account the particular circumstances by which the end is rightly achieved. For 
example, reason naturally dictates the end that one should live temperately, but it 
depends on prudence to find out how this is to be attained concretely in regard to 
the person concerned, the place, and the time.10
In the Secunda Secundae, Aquinas is very clear that prudence does not predetermine the 
end for moral virtues. This is the work of natural reason functioning as synderesis. For 
Aquinas, synderesis is an instinctive understanding on the part of practical reason o f the 
first principles of practice. ‘The end in matters of practice operates like a first principle 
in matters of theory’ (2a2ae.q.47, a.6).11 The role of prudence is limited to determining 
which courses of activity and specific actions actually instantiate the moral virtues in 
the particular situations that make up our lives. Thus the function of prudence ‘is not to 
appoint the ends for moral virtues, but only to arrange our activities which serve to 
reach them’ (ibid.). Aquinas concludes by stating that although prudence ranks above 
the moral virtues and moves them, ‘yet it is put forth from synderesis, rather as insight 
into principles advances into scientific knowledge’ (ibid., ad 3).
10 S t .  T h o m a s  A q u in a s ,  T rea tise  on  the Virtues, t r a n s .  b y  J o h n  A . O e s te r le ,  ( N o t r e  D a m e ,  IN :  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  N o t r e  D a m e  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  p .  1 5 4 , n .  2 7 .
11 S t .  T h o m a s  A q u in a s ,  Sum m a T h eologiae, B l a c k f r i a r s  E n g l i s h  a n d  L a t in  e d i t io n ,  61  v o ls ,  v o l .  3 6  ( 2 a 2 a e ,  
q q .  4 7 - 5 6 ) ,  e d .  b y  T h o m a s  G i lb y ,  O .P . ,  ( L o n d o n / N e w  Y o r k :  E y r e  &  S p o t t i s w o o d e /  M c G r a w - H i l l ,  1 9 7 4 ) .  
F o r  r e f e r e n c e  s y s t e m ,  s e e  f o o tn o te  9  a b o v e .
75
3.2.6 Some Contemporary Perspectives on Aquinas’s Doctrine of Synderesis
According to Denis J.M. Bradley, Aquinas’s doctrine of synderesis ‘transforms more 
than develops Aristotelian moral philosophy’ (p. 254). At this point in the Secunda 
Secundae, he sees Aquinas as ‘merely trying to shore up the cognitive foundations of 
Aristotelian phronesis’ (p. 249). Aristotle only recognizes the indemonstrable and 
necessary principles of theoretical reason; he does not mention ‘any universal, innate, 
indemonstrable principles of practical reason’ (p. 240). By extending the operation of 
understanding or nous to the practical order, Aquinas was able to ground morality in 
reason rather than in rightly habituated emotion. I suspect that most Aristotelian 
commentators would want to take issue with Bradley at this point. At 1143bl-3, 
Aristotle states that ‘in demonstrations understanding is about the unchanging terms that 
are first. In [premises] about action understanding is about the last term, the one that 
admits of being otherwise, and [hence] about the minor premise’. Referring to these 
lines, Anthony Kenny asserts that ‘it is common ground among commentators that in 
this passage Aristotle is teaching that there is a practical form of nous' (p. 170). 
However, Kenny does acknowledge that ‘first, and most explicitly, nous is the grasp of 
the first principles of theoretical science; the understanding of unproven necessary 
truths which is the basis of episteme (ibid.). Bradley’s summing up seems to me to be 
reasonably accurate. He states that in Aquinas ‘the act of synderesis certainly exceeds 
in scope, firmness, clarity, and significance the “true apprehension” of Aristotle’s 
phronimos’ (p. 256). In this context, Mark Daniel Nelson remarks that Aquinas ‘is 
wrestling with two traditions: the classical Aristotelian tradition of the virtues and the 
Christianized Stoic and Roman tradition of natural law’.12 He sees synderesis as a kind
12 M a r k  D a n ie l  N e l s o n ,  The P r io rity  o f  Pru dence: Virtue a n d  N a tu ra l L aw  in Thomas A quinas a n d  the 
Im plica tion s f o r  M odern  E thics, ( U n i v e r s i t y  P a rk :  P e n n s y lv a n i a  S ta t e  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 2 ) ,  p .  9 9 .
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of starting point; it explains how practical reasoning begins, but it does not supply 
content for the work of deliberating.
Thomas goes so far as to say that we have a natural knowledge that we ought to 
act reasonably with respect to goods, but the orientation of our will to authentic 
goods and our deliberations about how to achieve them are entirely dependent on 
the virtues we are able to develop with practice over a lifetime. Prudence 
determines what is reasonable. (Nelson, p. 99)
3.2.7 SLE.Vl.il -  A Final Stage in Aquinas’s Understanding
Doig suggests that Aquinas’s use of “predetermine” in Question 47, Article 6 of the 
Secunda Secundae represents a final setting aside of Albert’s way of speaking. Again, 
he draws our attention to Aristotle’s text at 1144b26-27 -  that virtue is not only ‘the 
state in accord with the correct reason, but the state involving the correct reason’. He 
goes on to state that if  Aquinas’s SLE. VI. 11 is read against this background of a 
gradual turning away from the terminology and teaching of Albert’s Super 
Ethica.Yl.lS, it can help us to appreciate that his interpretation of Aristotle at this point 
represents a final stage in his understanding (Doig, p. 62).
3.2.8 Prudence in Aquinas -  A More Holistic Perspective
Another significant difference between Albert and Aquinas is revealed when their 
interpretations of Aristotle’s statement at 1140b28-29 are examined. In these lines, 
Aristotle asserts that ‘prudence is not only a state involving reason. A sign of this is the 
fact that such a state can be forgotten, but prudence cannot’. Doig summarizes Albert’s 
interpretation of these lines ‘as indicating that prudence is in reason together with the
innate principles of the natural law’ (p. 63). The approach adopted by Aquinas is quite
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different. He begins by pointing out that prudence is an intellectual virtue because it 
resides in the rationally calculating or estimative part of the rational soul. Continuing, 
he states that ‘it is not connected with reason alone, as art or science, but it requires 
rectitude o f the appetitive faculty’ (SLE.VIA S  1174). An indication o f this is that a 
virtue such as art or science -  residing only in reason -  can be forgotten. The same 
cannot happen with prudence. ‘Prudence [...] is not forgotten by disuse, but it is 
destroyed by the cessation of right desire which, while remaining, is continually 
engaged with the things belonging to prudence, so that oblivion cannot come along 
unawares’ (ibid.). Whereas Albert interprets prudence solely in rational terms, Aquinas 
makes room for an appetitive or desiderative dimension. If prudence is conceived of as 
a habitus in a potency, it can only be in one potency, i.e., particular reason. In this 
context, Doig suggests that Aquinas writes ‘as if  he conceives of a prudent agent rather 
than of a habitus in a potency’ (p. 63). When Aquinas comments on Aristotle’s 
statement at 1140a24-25 that we should study the sort of people regarded as prudent so 
as to grasp the nature o f prudence, he remarks that Aristotle ‘determines the method of 
procedure, saying that we must accept what prudence is from a consideration of people 
classed as prudent’ (SXis.VL4.Sl 161). It is likely that a reflection such as this helped 
Aquinas to take a more holistic view compared to that taken by Albert. It is clear that 
he was well able to visualize a prudent agent in whom knowledge and desire were 
integrated. In SXX.VI.7.S1200, Aquinas again states that ‘prudence is not only in the 
reason but has a function likewise in the appetitive faculty’. He goes on to 
acknowledge that there are certain kinds of practical science, viz., domestic ethics and 
political science, which are exclusively in reason.
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3.3 SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF PRUDENCE IN AQUINAS
3.3.1 Three Different Types of Prudence
Following Aristotle in Chapter 8 of Book VI, Aquinas distinguishes different types of 
prudence -  civic prudence, domestic prudence and personal prudence. He defines 
personal prudence as ‘the right plan of things to be done in the light of what is good or 
bad for [...] oneself (SXÆ.VI.7.S1196). Personal ‘prudence and civic prudence are 
substantially the same habit’ (ibid.). However, civic prudence concerns things that are 
good or bad for the entire civic community. Its relation to personal prudence is like that 
between legal justice and virtue. Aquinas sees domestic or household prudence as 
occupying a middle position between that regulating the individual and the state. 
‘Because the whole is more important than the part, and consequently the city than the 
household and the household than one man, civic prudence must be more important 
than domestic and the latter more important than personal prudence’ (SX.E.VI.7.S1201). 
Aquinas interprets Aristotle as stating that the particular good of each individual 
requires both the proper administration of the household, i.e., domestic prudence, and 
the proper administration of the state, i.e., civic prudence. According to Aquinas, 
domestic and civic prudence -  though necessary -  are insufficient without personal 
prudence. ‘When the state and the household have been properly arranged, it is still not 
evident how one’s own personal affairs must be disposed. Therefore, it is necessary to 
attend to this by the prudence dealing with an individual’s good’ (tSX£'.VI.7.S1207). At 
an earlier point, Aquinas asserts that ‘that which is concerned with one person only, 
oneself, seems to be especially prudence’ (SZÆ.VI.7.S1199).
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3.3.2 The Need for Shrewdness (Dinotica)
In SEE.VI.10.S1271, Aquinas introduces an ‘operative principle that discovers ways 
leading to ends’ which he later refers to as ‘shrewdness’ {dinotica) or ‘a certain 
ingenuity’ (5XE.VI.10.S1272). Although necessary for virtue, this particular power or 
principle is not sufficient. ‘When the intention is good, ingenuity of this sort deserves 
praise, but when the intention is bad, it is called craftiness, which implies evil as 
prudence implies good’ (ibid.). It is the moral virtues that make all the difference here. 
‘The habit of prudence in the soul is not joined to this insight, i.e., this perceptive 
principle of shrewdness, without moral virtue which always refers to the good’ 
(SLE.VI.10.S1273). This is far removed from Albert’s innate principles or seed of 
prudence gradually developing into a habitus of a particular kind o f imperfect prudence 
in relation to a particular moral virtue. Instead, Aquinas puts forward this notion of 
shrewdness or ‘natural ingenuity, which guided by the first practical principles, and 
presupposing the correct orientation of the rational appetite, enables an agent to acquire 
the one habitus of prudence in tandem with the acquisition of all the moral virtues’ 
(Doig, p. 65).
3.3.3 From Natural Virtue to Moral Virtue -  The Integrating Function of 
Prudence
In SEE. VI. 11.SI 275, Aquinas follows Aristotle in Chapter 13 of Book VI by drawing a
parallel between shrewdness and prudence in the discursive part of the soul and natural
virtue and moral virtue in the appetitive part. He regards it as self-evident that virtues
or vices exist in some people naturally. ‘Immediately from birth certain men seem to be
just or temperate or brave because of a natural disposition by which they are inclined to
virtuous works’ {SLENIA  1.S1276). Aquinas goes on to state that natural virtue
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involves three elements: firstly, reason, because the first principles of human conduct 
are implanted by nature; secondly, the will, ‘which of itself is naturally moved by the 
good apprehended as its proper object’ (SLE.VI.11.S1277); and thirdly, the sensitive 
appetite. Only the sensitive appetite varies from person to person. By natural 
temperament, some people ‘are inclined to anger, others to concupiscence or passions of 
a different kind either too much or too little, or with moderation in which moral virtue 
consists’ (ibid.). According to Aquinas, the discrimination of reason is required to 
prevent the various natural habits and inclinations from leading us astray. Only a habit 
that ‘accepts reason in its operation so that it operates with discretion [...] will be a 
virtue in the proper and perfect sense, i.e., a moral virtue’ (SLE.YIA 1 .S I279). Thus 
Aquinas strongly supports what he calls ‘Aristotle’s middle position’ which maintains 
‘that moral virtue is according to reason and accompanied by reason’ (>SXE.VI.S1285). 
He goes on to affirm that it is not possible for a person to be good ‘according to moral 
virtue, without prudence, nor even to be prudent without moral virtue’ (ibid.). It is in 
regard to the moral virtues -  and not the natural virtues -  that a person is called good 
without qualification. This is because the moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, 
nor can prudence exist without the moral virtues. ‘When there is prudence, which is a 
single virtue, all the virtues will be simultaneous with it, and none of them will be 
present if  prudence is not there’ (SLE.VIA 1 .S1287).
That prudence, according to Aquinas, has an integrating function is also well brought
out in the Prima Secundae. Without prudence, the natural habits and inclinations do not
become full virtues. As he himself states, ‘natural inclinations fail to have the complete
character of virtue if prudence is lacking’ (la2ae. q.65, a .l, ad 1). Aquinas offers as an
example a person who behaves ‘well in matters of anger, but not in matters of
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concupiscence’ (ibid.). Such a person ‘will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining 
his anger. This habit, however, will lack the quality of virtue, through the absence of 
prudence, which is wanting in matters o f concupiscence’ (ibid.). In the same article, he 
sums up as follows at a later point: ‘the whole matter of moral virtue falls under the 
single rule of prudence’ (ad 3). His final conclusion is that ‘the lack of prudence in one 
field of things to be done would result in a deficiency elsewhere about other things to be 
done’ (ibid., ad 4).
3.3.4 Prudence Concerns Universals and Particulars
Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely in underlining the fact that prudence involves 
both universals and particulars. The prudent person has the ability to make effective 
links between universal principles and particular situations, which are variable and 
unpredictable. In S!LE. VI.7.S1208, he asserts that an indication that prudence is not 
only concerned with universals but also with particulars is the fact that a young person 
can become highly competent in the speculative sciences and in mathematics, but ‘it 
does not seem that a youth can become prudent. The reason is that prudence deals with 
particulars which are made known to us by experience’. Because a great deal of time is 
needed to acquire such experience, a young person cannot be expected to have it. 
Aquinas goes on to point out that because the work of prudence is deliberative, it can be 
in error in two ways. ‘One concerns the universal, e.g., whether it is true that all 
sluggish waters are unhealthy. The other concerns the particular, e.g., whether this 
water is sluggish. Therefore, prudence must give direction in regard to both universals 
and particulars’ (SLE.VI.7.S1212).
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3.3.5 Prudence and the Virtues of the Speculative Intellect
Continuing, Aquinas compares prudence with scientific knowledge. Whereas scientific 
knowledge is concerned with universals, prudence has to do with ‘a singular ultimate, 
viz., the particular, since it is of the nature of the practicable to be particular’ 
(SI&VI.7.S1213). Thus there is a clear distinction between prudence and scientific 
knowledge. Aquinas goes on to compare prudence with understanding. They are alike 
in that they both have to do with ultimates. Understanding concerns ‘indemonstrable 
principles for which there is no proof (SXi?.VI.7.S1214). Prudence concerns the 
‘singular practicable that must be taken as a principle in things to be done’ (ibid.). 
Although knowledge of the singular ultimate cannot be proved by reason, there is 
genuine knowledge of it through what Aquinas terms ‘the inner sense which perceives 
things sensibly conceivable’ (ibid.) -  as in mathematics. Prudence and understanding 
differ in that ‘understanding is not given to inquiry, but prudence is, because it is 
deliberative’ (SLE.VI.7.S1216).
In SLE.Vl.6.S\ 190, Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely in stating that wisdom is the
combination of scientific knowledge and understanding -  ‘not of all possible things but
of the most honorable’. As the science of the most divine things, it is the principal
intellectual virtue. He upholds the dignity of science and wisdom. ‘The speculative
sciences are not sought as useful for some further end but simply as honorable in
themselves’ (iSTE.VL6.Sl 185). Their objects are necessary and universal. ‘Wisdom is
the same without qualification in relation to everything’ (SLE.W1.6.SI 187). One of the
main characteristics of prudence is that it consists in ‘a proportion and a relation to
something. The man who can properly consider each thing pertaining to him is said to
be prudent and to such a one we grant or attribute prudence’ (ibid.). After considering
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how philosophers such as Anaxagoras and Thales are regarded as wise but not as 
prudent, Aquinas asserts that ‘prudence deals with human goods about which we 
deliberate. Now, to deliberate well seems to be the special work of the prudent man’ 
(SLE.VI.6.SI 193). It is not possible to deliberate about things that are necessary 
because they cannot be otherwise.
Similarly, ‘deliberation is not possible about things in general that are not ordered to 
some end, i.e., to a practicable good’ (ibid.). Because prudence is concerned with 
practicable things, it considers both universals and particulars. Because action has to do 
with particulars or singulars, the knowledge o f particulars is often more important than 
the knowledge of universals, in which action does not occur. Aquinas considers as an 
example a doctor who has knowledge of universals but lacks knowledge of particulars. 
Such a doctor -  knowing that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but not 
knowing which meats are light -  is not able to help people to get well. ‘But the man 
who knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful is better able to effect a cure’ 
(SL£.VI.6.S1194). Thus the morally astute person is like a good doctor in that he is 
able to make prudent judgments about particular cases. For Aquinas, prudence is very 
much a positive virtue because it enables a person to apply the right principle in every 
situation. Although being prudent can involve being cautious and defensive in certain 
situations, it would be a distortion to identify it with such an approach generally.
Contrary to modem concepts of moral virtue, virtue for St Thomas is not 
primarily about obeying rales. It is just the virtue of prudence which frees us 
from having to refer to the book of rales to see what is right in any situation, and 
gives us a confident command of applying principles rightly in new situations on
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our own. Prudence establishes right reason about things to be done, whereas the 
virtues of the speculative intellect are for the truth that is to be know nu
3.3.6 The Perfecting Function of Prudence
In 1ST£’.VL10.S1269, Aquinas underlines that prudence perfects practical reason- a part 
of the human soul that is ‘rational by essence’. And the moral virtues perfect the 
appetite -  the part that is ‘rational by participation’. The perfecting function of 
prudence and all the other virtues is a recurring theme in Aquinas’s writings. In the 
Prima Secundae, for example, he states that ‘human virtue is a habit perfecting man so 
that he may act well’ (la2ae.q.58, a.3). Continuing, he reminds his readers that there 
are two principles or sources of human actions, viz., the intellect or reason and the 
appetite. ‘Consequently, every human virtue is necessarily perfective of one of these 
principles’ (ibid.). A virtue that perfects the speculative or practical intellect so that its 
activity may be good will be an intellectual virtue. A virtue that perfects the appetite 
will be a moral virtue. Although prudence ‘is counted among the moral virtues’ (ibid., 
ad 1) and requires them for its exercise, strictly speaking, it is an intellectual virtue.
3.3.7 Prudence Involves Deliberation, Judgment and the Commanding of Action
It is also in SX£'.VI.10.S1269 that prudence is referred to as giving good advice, judging
and ordering the means to the end. This is an example of Aquinas going well beyond a
simple comment on or interpretation of the corresponding text in Aristotle so as to give
his own view. According to Aquinas, there are three stages in every action:
deliberation, judgment and the command of the will. Prudence requires excellence in
deliberation, ‘which is associated with the inquiry of reason [...] (and) takes time’
13 F r a n c i s  S e lm a n ,  A sp ec ts  o f  A quinas, ( D u b l in :  V e r i t a s  P u b l i c a t i o n s ,  2 0 0 5 ) ,  p .  1 4 3 .
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(SLE.VI.8.S1219). Genuine deliberation or eubulia consists in that rectitude which 
aims at ‘an absolutely good end, by suitable methods and at an opportune time’ 
(SLE.V 1.8.S1234). In the Secunda Secundae, Aquinas refers to eubulia or ‘well 
advisedness’ as a virtue that is allied to prudence. He describes it as ‘the activity of 
deliberating well, or rather, the cast of mind towards it’ (2a2ae. q.51, a.l). It is the 
virtue that ‘makes a man of good counsel’ (2a2ae. q51, a.2); it ‘is ordered to prudence 
as to the more principal virtue, without which it would not be a virtue’ (ibid.).
In «STE.VI.9.S1240, Aquinas states that synesis or right judgment is more excellent than 
deliberation or eubulia, ‘for inquiry is ordered to judgment as to an end’. People who 
can judge well about things to be done are called ‘syneti and eusyneti, i.e., people of 
sense and people of good sense’ (ibid.). ‘ Synesis signifies a right judgment [...] in the 
majority o f cases’ (STE.VI.9.S1243). In the succeeding paragraphs, Aquinas introduces 
another virtue, gnome, which is the disposition to be able to judge exceptional cases. In 
the Secunda Secundae, he refers to gnome as ‘a superior virtue of judiciousness [...], 
which implies a certain sharp-sightedness of judgment’ (2a2ae. q.51, a.4).
In £L£.VI.9.S1239, Aquinas points out that practical reason does not halt at the point of
judgment, ‘but proceeds further to do something. Hence there is required a third work,
as it were final and perfecting, viz., to command that the thing be done. This properly
belongs to prudence’. Continuing, he states that ‘prudence is preceptive inasmuch as
the work of the end is to determine what must be done’ (SXfs.VI.9.S1240). Thus
prudence involves more than good deliberation and sound judgment. Making sure that
the right action is performed is o f fundamental importance. In her book, The Recovery
o f  Virtue, Jean Porter states that ‘because command is the act of prudence which is most
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directly connected to action, Aquinas identifies it as the chief act o f prudence’.14 This 
interpretation is supported by what Aquinas himself writes in the Secunda Secundae. 
After asserting that the practical intellect is meant for the doing o f things, he states that 
the act o f commanding ‘consists in bringing into execution what has been thought out 
and decided on. And because this approaches more closely to what the practical reason 
is for, it is a chief act o f the practical reason, and so of prudence as well’ (2a2ae. q.47, 
a.8).
14 J e a n  P o r te r .  The R ecovery  o f  Virtue: The R elevan ce o f  A quinas f o r  C hristian  E thics, ( L o u i s v i l l e ,  K Y : 
W e s t m in s t e r / J o h n  K n o x ,  1 9 9 0 ) ,  p .  1 6 3 .
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As we have seen, Aristotle holds that only the prudent person is fully virtuous. A good 
deliberator, he is able to determine the kind of action that will promote eudaimonia or 
human flourishing in different kinds of situations. His practical perception enables him 
to discern the kind of situation he is in and the kind of action he needs to do. Having 
considered his situation, he chooses in accordance with his wish to do the kind of action 
that will best promote eudaimonia. And he acts on his choice correctly carrying out an 
action of the proper kind. In this way, the person who is prudent is able to succeed in 
action through giving himself the correct orders. For Aristotle, prudence is an 
intellectual virtue of the calculating or practical part of the rational soul. The function 
of the rationally calculating part is to enable a person to do what best promotes 
eudaimonia. As commentators such as Cooper and Reeve insist, although the 
deliberations of the prudent person can embrace both means and ends, they cannot be 
about the ultimate end, i.e., eudaimonia. In this context, the role of the intellectual 
virtue of understanding or nous is particularly important. ‘It is no part of the function of 
phronesis to discover what eudaimonia is. That function belongs to scientific 
knowledge, dialectic, and nous' (Reeve, p. 97). Even though prudence and practical 
knowledge are crucially important, the intellectual virtues of the scientific part of the 
rational soul and theoretical knowledge are also needed. Reeve’s interpretation of 
Aristotle at this point closely resembles that of Kraut, which was followed in Chapter 
Two. ‘Study expressing wisdom is primary eudaimonia', practical activity expressing 
phronesis is secondary eudaimonia', and the latter is for the sake o f the former’ (Reeve, 
p. 97).
Although more than 1,500 years o f history and much else separate Thomas Aquinas
from Aristotle, the extent to which Aquinas’s doctrine o f prudence seems to resemble
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that of Aristotle is -  at first sight -  remarkable. I suspect Aquinas would be quite happy 
to endorse almost completely the admittedly rather sketchy outline of Aristotle’s notion 
of prudence given in the above paragraph. However, I think he would want to highlight 
his belief that Aristotle’s conception of ultimate end or eudaimonia can only be realized 
in an imperfect way in this life. In SLE.\ .16.S202, after stating that ‘those we call 
happy are men, subject to change in this life, who cannot attain perfect beatitude’, 
Aquinas asserts that ‘perfect beatitude is reserved for man after this life’. At an earlier 
point, he acknowledges that Aristotle ‘speaks of happiness as it is attainable in this life, 
for happiness in a future life is entirely beyond the investigation of reason’ 
(SLEA.9.SW3). At 1098al8-20, Aristotle states that the human good ‘must be in a 
complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day; nor similarly, 
does one day or a short time make us blessed and happy’. Aquinas interprets these lines 
as meaning that ‘continuity and perpetuity, to some extent, are [...] required for 
happiness’ (SZ2s.l.lO.S129). At a later stage, he asserts that continuity and perpetuity, 
which belong to the nature of perfect happiness, are not found in the present life. 
‘Hence perfect happiness cannot be had in this life’ (ibid.). With a passage such as this 
in mind, Ralph Mclnemy states that Aquinas ‘is able to say that Aristotle, by his own 
statement, has described an imperfect happiness’.1 Nevertheless, Aquinas does not 
consider that Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia is in conflict with the notion that 
human happiness consists in union with God for all eternity. ‘There is but one concept 
of ultimate, but there are two realizations of it, one imperfect, the other perfect’ (ibid.).
1 T h o m a s  A q u in a s ,  D isp u te d  Q u estion s in Virtue: Q u aestio  D ispu ta ta  de  Virtutibus in Com m uni a n d  
Q u aestio  D ispu ta ta  d e  V irtutibus C ard in a libu s,  t r a n s ,  b y  R a lp h  M c l n e m y  ( S o u th  B e n d ,  IN :  S t. 
A u g u s t i n e 's  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 9 ) ,  p .  x v i i .
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In his book, Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas, Daniel 
Westberg mentions that Gauthier considered that Aquinas ‘radically altered Aristotle’s 
account of phronesis by his theological concerns’.2 He states that Gauthier ‘identified 
synderesis and the will as the major innovations in Aquinas’s account of practical 
reason as compared to Aristotle’s’ (Westberg, p. 29). According to this view, the 
introduction of synderesis diminishes the role of prudence as regards how the basic ends 
of human action are to be understood. The suggestion might be that we are left with ‘a 
limited prudentia which works within a framework of principles already developed (and 
furnished by a different form of knowledge) and whose function is merely to select and 
apply’ (Westberg, p. 32). This would be in marked contrast to Aristotle’s ‘open-ended 
phronesis which begins with desire for an end’ (ibid.). Westberg starts to deal with 
what he considers as Gauthier’s ‘fundamentally flawed’ (ibid., p.30) understanding of 
Aquinas’s relation to Aristotle by drawing our attention to ‘a de-emphasis on synderesis 
in the Summa Theologiae as compared to earlier works’ (ibid.). He might have added 
that there is no mention at all o f synderesis in Aquinas’s Sententia libri Ethicorum. 
James C. Doig also notices ‘the little attention paid synderesis in the Summa theologiae’ 
(Aquinas’s Commentary, p. 186). He goes on to state that ‘the reader cannot but be 
surprised to find not only no mention of synderesis in Aquinas’s commentary on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, but as well no reference to a “natural habitus” of the first 
indemonstrable principles of morality’ (ibid.). However, there is an indirect reference 
that Doig does not acknowledge. In SLE.YI.l 1.S1277, Aquinas states in relation to 
natural virtue that ‘it can be considered first on the part of reason, since the first 
principles of human conduct are implanted by nature, for instance, that no one should be
2 D a n ie l  W e s t b e r g ,  R igh t P ra c tica l R eason: A risto tle, A ction, a n d  P ru den ce in A quinas, ( O x f o r d :  
C l a r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 4 ) ,  p .  2 9 .
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injured, and the like’. Doig is in no doubt but that ‘Aquinas was convinced that the 
Ethics contained a doctrine equivalent to synderesis’ (ibid.). As indicated in Chapter 
Three, Aristotle’s notion of practical nous is basically compatible with Aquinas’s 
doctrine of synderesis, even if  it is not as clear or as well developed. Indeed, it could be 
argued that Aquinas’s hierarchy of synderesis, prudence and the moral virtues is more 
Aristotle than Aristotle himself.
In my opinion, Westberg is very insightful when he points to the difficulty of balancing 
‘the themes of contingency and freedom on the one hand, and on the other, necessity 
and truth’ (p. 33) in accounts o f practical reason. ‘Since all of these elements are 
stressed at various times by Aristotle, we should be careful not to minimize them’ 
(ibid.). For example, the material discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis under the 
subheading -  The Challenge o f Dealing Adequately with the Complexity of Ethical 
Issues -  might be considered as reflecting the theme of contingency and freedom; 
whereas the material in the next paragraph o f Chapter Two under the subheading -  
Knowledge and Right Reason in Aristotle’s Ethics -  might be considered as reflecting 
the theme of necessity and truth. According to Westberg, it seems almost impossible 
‘to combine the two themes in one process of reasoning’ (ibid., p. 33) in the case of 
Aquinas’s teaching. He makes a contrast between ‘what can be regarded as an 
ambiguous attitude to truth in Aristotle’ (ibid.), which gives rise to a more fluid system, 
and Aquinas’s ‘assertion of truth in the connection of natural law and eternal law’ 
(ibid.) as a result of his theological concerns. His conclusion is that a choice has to be 
made ‘either to emphasize the Aristotelian teleological element (and soften his teaching 
on law and truth in the practical syllogism), or to emphasize the absolute starting-points
and the importance of truth but lose some of the Aristotelian freedom’ (ibid., pp. 33-34).
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Jean-Pierre Torrell refers to Aquinas’s Sententia libri Ethicorum as ‘indeed a Sententia, 
which is to say a summary [...] and not an expositio, an in-depth commentary with 
textual discussions’ (p. 228). Torrell goes on to suggest that Aquinas’s title should be 
taken as an indication that he did not want his Commentary on Aristotle’s 
‘Nicomachean Ethics ’ to be regarded as a critical commentary. Gauthier also highlights 
this point. In his book, Aquinas on Human Action, Ralph Mclnemy takes issue with 
Gauthier, who ‘dismissed the commentary as useless’.4 According to Mclnemy, 
Aquinas’s ‘commentaries on Aristotle are precious aids for understanding the text of 
Aristotle’ (ibid., p. 163). As regards the SLE and Aristotle’s notion of prudence, I think 
the truth of Mclnemy’s statement and that of another statement made by Norman 
Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump are well borne out. Kretzmann and Stump assert that 
all Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries ‘are marked by his extraordinary ability as a 
philosophical commentator to discern a logical structure in almost every passage he 
examines in every sort of text’.5
When one focuses on the SLE, the extent to which Aquinas’s doctrine of pmdence 
resembles that of Aristotle is striking. As outlined in Chapter Three, the accounts of 
Aquinas and Aristotle are almost identical as regards issues such as the nature of 
pmdence as an intellectual virtue residing in the practical reason and concerned with 
things to be done, the relationship between prudence and moral virtue, the distinction 
between natural virtue and full virtue, the reciprocity of the virtues, the need for 
shrewdness, the fact that pmdence concerns both universal s and particulars, the
4 R a lp h  M c l n e r n y ,  A qu in as on  H um an A ction : A T heory o f  P ractice , ( W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . :  T h e  C a th o l ic  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  A m e r ic a  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 2 ) ,  p .  1 7 7 .
5 N o r m a n  K r e tz m a n n  a n d  E le o n o r e  S tu m p ,  ‘A q u in a s ,  T h o m a s ’ in  R ou tledge E n cyc lo ped ia  o f  P hilosophy, 
e d . b y  E d w a r d  C r a i g  a n d  o t h e r s ,  1 0  v o ls  ( L o n d o n :  R o u t l e d g e ,  1 9 9 8 ) ,  1 , p p .3 2 6 - 3 5 0  (p .  3 3 1 ) .
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importance of deliberation, judgment, and the commanding of action, the distinction 
between prudence and the intellectual virtues that are theoretical, etc. Aquinas’s stress 
on the commanding of action as the chief act of prudence might seem to be in conflict 
with Aristotle’s stress on deliberation and decision. However, this conflict is more 
apparent than real. The commanding o f action is the final stage -  the culmination of a 
process. Its perfection necessarily includes the perfecting of the stages leading to it, 
e.g., deliberation and decision. According to Denis J.M. Bradley, Aquinas’s 
interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding o f theoretical wisdom and the contemplative 
life as pre-eminent is ‘remarkably in harmony with’ (p. 154, n. 73) that of Richard 
Kraut, which was discussed in Chapter Two. In terms of the modern division between 
an intellectualist and an inclusivist interpretation of Aristotelian eudaimonia, it seems 
that Aquinas would belong more naturally on the intellectualist side.
A drawback in treating o f Aquinas’s teachings on prudence principally in the context of 
the Sententia libri Ethicorum is that the way in which he departs from Aristotle in some 
of his more theological writings is concealed. Although the SLE represents Aquinas’s 
views, it does not represent the full theological treatment as found in a work such as the 
Summa Theologiae. For example, in Question 58 of the Prima Secundae, Aquinas 
weakens the distinction between prudence and art or craft. After quoting Augustine’s 
saying that virtue is the art of right conduct, Aquinas states that ‘this applies to prudence 
essentially, but to other virtues by participation, in so far as they are directed by it’ (a. 1, 
ad 1). In Question 61 of the Prima Secundae, which treats of the cardinal virtues, 
Aquinas refers to prudence as ‘something of a moral virtue’ (a. 1). When speaking 
strictly, Aquinas regards prudence as an intellectual virtue. However, he sometimes
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follows the tradition of placing all the cardinal virtues, including prudence, among the 
moral virtues.
In this context, other examples that could be considered include the relationship 
between prudence and the theological virtues caused by grace, the distinction between 
acquired prudence and infused prudence, and the link between prudence and God’s 
providence. It is in the discussion of these theological issues, which go beyond 
Aristotle’s philosophical scope, that it becomes clear that Aquinas’s understanding of 
prudence involves an added dimension. This added dimension makes quite a significant 
difference. For example, in the Prima Secundae, after discussing the virtues of faith, 
hope and charity, Aquinas states that ‘charity is the mother and the root of all the 
virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all’ (la2ae. q.62, a.4). Although prudence is 
the mother and the root of the virtues of character, it is charity that ‘moulds even 
prudence itself (Pieper, p. 58). The kind of prudence Aquinas has in mind here is 
acquired prudence and not infused prudence, which he introduces at a later stage. The 
relationship of charity to this acquired prudence as its formal cause distinguishes it quite 
sharply from Aristotle’s phronesis. For Aquinas, the overriding concern was to develop 
a teaching on practical reasoning and its perfecting in the virtue of pmdence that would 
be consistent with both the truth he saw in Aristotle and the truth Christian theology 
provides in helping the person to ascend to God.
As we have seen, Aristotle understands the person as having two major capabilities on
account of his possessing a rational soul. One capability is theoretical and is for
understanding how things are. The other capability is practical and involves two
dimensions -  one relating to action or the doing of things, and the other relating to
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production or the making of things. The prudent person is one who is good at thinking 
about how to act wisely and live well. Very importantly, he also succeeds in actually 
living a fulfilled and worthwhile life. In this way, he realizes the potential of his 
practical reason as regards the dimension of action. According to Aristotle, only the 
person who actually deliberates about and personally decides to do virtuous actions for 
their own sakes is fully or perfectly virtuous. ‘Full virtue cannot be acquired without 
prudence’ (1144bl 6-17). Thus Aristotle is clear that although prudence is based on a 
naturally virtuous character, full virtue only develops when the person decides for 
himself that he will be temperate, courageous, just, etc. It is significant that prudence, 
unlike the virtues of character, does not have a natural state and a full or perfect state. 
Prudence is by definition a perfect virtue, and it is for this reason that it develops the 
virtues of character into full or perfect virtues. It seems to me that this relationship of 
interdependence between prudence and the virtues of character is probably the most 
distinctive aspect o f Aristotle’s account o f the ethical life. That it is also highly 
significant is well brought out by J. Donald Monan in his book, Moral Knowledge and 
its Methodology in Aristotle!’
For, once having asserted that moral knowledge depends upon one’s morally good 
praxis or conduct, he (Aristotle) cannot choose an ultimate norm which is purely 
objectivistic, or constituted ‘in itself, without man. And, once having established 
that morally responsible action depends upon knowing why it is good, he cannot 
choose an ultimate norm which is purely volitional. To save the two elements of 
his doctrine he had to choose a norm in which true reason and right desire are 
synthesized, which is in effect the definition of the phronimos. (Monan, pp. 80-
81)
6 J . D o n a l d  M o n a n ,  M o ra l K n o w led g e  a n d  its  M eth o d o lo g y  in A ris to tle ,  ( O x f o r d :  C l a r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  1 9 6 8 ) .
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At the end of this thesis, I am very conscious that some questions remain unanswered. 
In relation to Aristotle, it seems to me that the most important question concerns the 
conflict between the kind of intellectualist interpretation of eudaimonia and the 
contemplative life that has been put forward by such as Kraut -  as outlined in Chapter 
Two -  and Aristotle’s views about virtue as outlined in the above paragraph. When 
Aristotle identifies happiness with contemplation, he seems to hold that the person can 
have sufficient reason to choose the virtues of character and their corresponding actions 
only to the extent that they promote his contemplation, i.e., his exercise of the virtue of 
theoretical wisdom. Viewed from this perspective, prudence and the moral virtues are 
seen as instrumental means to an ontologically distinct end, i.e., contemplation. 
However, Aristotle also holds that the person has sufficient reason to choose the virtues 
of character and their corresponding actions for their own sakes, and not just to the 
extent that they are instrumental means to something else. On this view, moral action is 
its own end. Because of the conflict between these two perspectives in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, it is hardly surprising that some commentators, e.g., Ackrill and 
Nussbaum, have concluded that it is not possible to reconcile Aristotle’s treatment of 
eudaimonia and the contemplative life with his treatment of prudence, the virtues of 
character and the ethical life. In relation to Aquinas, there are also some unanswered 
questions. Certainly, the extent to which his teachings on prudence should be 
characterized as Aristotelian is an issue that would require a far more extensive study 
than has been possible in these pages. Nevertheless, 1 think it is safe to conclude that 
his notion of prudence is not as thoroughly Aristotelian as is sometimes assumed. 
Aquinas’s elevation of charity to a position of pre-eminence among the virtues suggests 
another question. To what extent is the self-sacrificing love of a truly Christian ethic
compatible with an Aristotelian notion of prudence that emphasizes personal fulfilment?
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Perhaps, to paraphrase Ackrill in his remark on Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, 
both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, in their various writings, are like most great 
philosophers in that they raise more questions than they answer. It is my hope to return 
to deal with these questions in a future study.
7 J .  L .  A c k r i l l ,  ‘A r i s to t l e  o n  E u d a im o n ia ’, i n  A r is to t le ’s  E th ics  ( s e e  N u s s b a u m  [ 1 9 9 9 ]  a b o v e ) ,  p p .  5 7 - 7 7  
(p .  5 7 ) .
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